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ABSTRACT
Sodium cooled fast reactors (SFRs) are considered as a novel example to exercise the
Technology Neutral Framework (TNF) proposed in NUREG- 1860. One reason for considering
SFRs is that they have historically had a licensing problem due to postulated core disruptive
accidents. Two SFR designs are considered, and both meet the goals of the TNF that LWRs
typically would not. Considering these goals have been met, a method for improving economics
is proposed where systems of low risk-importance are identified as candidates for removal,
simplification, or removal from safety grade. Seismic risk dominates these designs and is found
to be a limiting factor when applying the TNF.
The contributions of this thesis are the following:
1. Functional event trees are developed as a tool to allow different designs to be compared
on an equal basis. Functional event trees are useful within the TNF as a method for the
selection of Licensing Basis Events (LBEs) which take the place of traditional Design
Basis Accidents.
2. A new importance measure, Limit Exceedance Factor (LEF), is introduced that measures
the margin in system failure probability. It can be used directly with the TNF where
standard importance measures cannot. It also reveals that some systems that appear to be
of high risk-importance with standard importance measures may have significant margin.
3. The seismic risk dominates these designs. It is shown that even under optimistic
assumptions, the goals of the TNF cannot be met by a typical reactor. The effect of
seismic isolation to reduce the frequency of seismically initiated large releases is also
analyzed and found to be insufficient to reach the goals of the TNF. A limit on initiating
event frequency that is consistent with current practices is proposed.
Thesis Supervisor: George E. Apostolakis
Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering
Professor of Engineering Systems
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SUMMARY
I. INTRODUCTION
Sodium-cooled fast reactors (SFRs) are a mature reactor technology. Experimental and
prototype SFRs have been constructed and operated in several countries for more than 60 years.
They have been considered an option for both running a closed fuel cycle and actinide
management for legacy waste in projects such as the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative and as part
of the goal of Generation IV.
In this thesis, the focus is on pool type SFRs. This type of reactor design contains all of the
primary sodium in the reactor vessel. An intermediate heat exchanger transfers heat from the
primary sodium to a secondary heat transfer loop. This loop transports heat to the steam
generator. Some of the important operating characteristics that set SFRs apart from LWRs are a
higher operating temperature (-500 'C compared to -300 'C), a long thermal response time, a
large margin to coolant boiling, a low pressure primary system, no emergency electricity
generators, and a positive void coefficient (Gyorey, Hardy, and McGee 1992).
Historically, SFRs have been considered to be more expensive per MWe than traditional light
water reactors (LWRs). One of the reasons for this has been the poor capacity factor experience
at some sites such as SuperPhenix and Monju. Another reason, and the focus of this thesis, is
that the licensing process has been difficult for SFRs in the United States.
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L.A Current Regulations
10CFR50, the current set of licensing regulations, is generally designed for use with LWRs.
Many of the General Design Criteria (GDC) do not necessarily apply to SFRs or other advanced
reactor designs. In NUREG-1368, the Preliminary Safety Evaluation Report (PSER) for the
PRISM reactor, the NRC agreed with General Electric (GE) that, for the PRISM SFR, LOCAs
are not an accident of concern. There was some disagreement on which of the GDCs might
apply, but both parties agreed that many of them would require modification.
The current US SFR licensing knowledge has come about from the Clinch River Breeder Reactor
(CRBR) and the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor (ALMR) program interactions with the NRC.
In the 1970s and early 1980s, licensing was initiated for the CRBR but funding was cut before a
construction permit was issued. Core Disruptive Accidents (CDAs) have been a licensing issue
for SFRs and particularly caused problems in the licensing of the Clinch River Breeder Reactor
(CRBR). These accidents were originally postulated as a sudden voiding of the reactor core
resulting in the insertion of a large amount of positive reactivity and causing energetic
disassembly of the reactor core. This accident was not considered as a design basis but was a
driving force causing the designers to change the core layout to reduce the energetics of such
postulated events. Other preventative and mitigating measures were also included in the design
to address CDAs (Strawbridge and Clare 1985).
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Although core disruptive accidents (CDAs) were not considered as part of the design basis for
the CRBR, a large amount of regulatory attention was given to these accidents which prolonged
the licensing process (Ivans, 2006). The CRBR licensing process did result in a Safety
Evaluation Report in 1983, NUREG-0968.
In order to avoid the regulatory delays associated with addressing CDAs, the ALMR design
incorporated additional passive safety measures into the PRISM design including gas expansion
modules and an ultimate shutdown system. Under the ALMR program, the DOE submitted a
Preliminary Safety Information Document (PSID) to the NRC in 1986 and the NRC in turn
issued a Pre-application Safety Evaluation Report (PSER) in 1994. As a result of this
interaction, the NRC forced changes to the PRISM reactor including the adoption of a
containment dome and the addition of an ultimate shutdown system and gas expansion modules
(GEMs) to satisfy defense-in-depth concerns (Ivans, 2006).
I. TECHNOLOGY NEUTRAL FRAMEWORK OVERVIEW
The NRC Office of Research has published NUREG-1860, a study on the feasibility of a risk-
informed and performance-based licensing framework. This framework is referred to in this
thesis as the Technology Neutral Framework (TNF). It is important to note that it is not a
regulation and will almost certainly be changed before final implementation, if it actually occurs.
PBMR (Pty) Ltd. has proposed a risk-informed and performance-based licensing strategy to the
NRC, though not specifically following NUREG- 1860. The NRC has deferred any rulemaking
until the pre-application reaches a further level of detail (US DOE 2008). Similarly, the NRC
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plans to test the TNF in parallel with a separate licensing structure for the Next Generation
Nuclear Plant (NGNP) (or any other High Temperature Gas Reactor design certification or
Combined License application) in which LWR licensing requirements will be modified.
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Figure 1. The F-C Curve
11
C.,
Cr
U-
In the TNF, PRA methods play a central role in determining licensing basis events (LBEs) which
take the place of traditional DBAs. Within the TNF approach, accident sequences are grouped
according to similar phenomenology and consequences. The limits set in NUREG- 1860 are on a
per-LBE basis (Figure 1). LBEs with a high frequency of occurrence must have low
consequences to be acceptable. LBEs with a low frequency are allowed to have higher
consequences. All LBEs must lie below the frequency-consequence curve (F-C curve). This
curve has been developed to be commensurate or more conservative than current NRC and EPA
regulations. Appendix H of the TNF describes which portions of 1OCFR50 are applicable within
the framework.
The LBE representing a group of sequences is assigned the 9 5 th percentile frequency of the most
likely sequence in the group and the 9 5th percentile consequence from the worst (or most
challenging) consequence sequence in the group. The systems whose performance is required to
keep the LBEs below the F-C curve are categorized as safety related and must conform to the
special treatment requirements of safety-related systems.
The lowest frequency considered, as seen in Figure 1, is 10-7 per reactor year. NUREG-1860
specifies that LBEs with a mean frequency less than 10~7 per reactor year "are screened from the
process". In addition, the report advises to "Drop all PRA sequences with point estimate
frequency < 1.E-8 per year."i
The TNF also includes deterministic requirements for the probabilistically selected LBEs. One
example from these requirements is that a certain number of barriers remaining to fission product
The notation 1.E-8 means x10-.
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release must remain intact depending on the frequency of the sequence. For more frequent
sequences more barriers must stay intact. Another example is that the core must maintain a
coolable geometry for all sequences greater than 10-5 per year.
A deterministic requirement is that a deterministic LBE is to be negotiated between the licensee
and the regulator. This event is to represent "a serious challenge to fission product retention in
the fuel and coolant system." Finally, there are defense-in-depth guidelines regarding protective
systems, stable operation, barrier integrity, and protective actions. These guidelines should lead
to a balanced design with a high level of safety. The specific requirements are detailed in
Appendix G of the TNF.
There is a parallel set of requirements within the TNF for security. However, there is not a great
deal of guidance as to how it would be demonstrated that the quantitative health objectives
(QHOs) are satisfied. Diversion scenarios are included as part of the security threat and are to
meet the requirements of 1OCFR73.
The primary change from 1OCFR50 to the TNF is that LBEs, which are actual sequences
determined for each plant design, take the place of postulated DBAs. DBAs are stylized
accidents that do not take frequencies into account. A major feature is that there is a stated
frequency cutoff for events that are within the licensing basis. This is an important point for
SFRs as a designer may argue that CDAs lie far below this cutoff. This could potentially prevent
excessive regulatory attention to these very rare events.
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II.A. SFR PRA REVIEW
Using the TNF requires the availability of a PRA. The available PRAs for sodium reactors are
for PRISM (Hackford 1986), EBR-II (Hill 1991), and ALMR (El-Sheikh 1994). ALMR and
PRISM are both pool type reactors that are less than a megawatt thermal. The PRAs for PRISM
and ALMR were performed by GE staff. The lack of detail of these documents reflects the fact
that these designs are in the conceptual phase. The PRISM PRA is Level 3 while the ALMR
PRA is only Level 1. The PRA for EBR-II is thorough and similar to other modem Level 1
PRAs. All of the PRAs include seismic initiators with only EBR-II including fire initiators.
There are some features that all of the PRAs share in common. All of the reactors are assessed to
have internally initiated core damage frequencies below typical GEN-II PWRs. Additionally, the
risk for each of these designs is dominated by seismic initiators. This information is summarized
in Table 2. Finally all of the PRAs include only point estimates for all events.
Table 2. Core Damage Frequency Summary
Design Internal CDF (per year) Seismic Contribution to
CDF
EBR-II 2x10~6  2x10~5
PRISM 1x10~8  5x10 8
ALMR 1x10 10  3x10 6
II.A.1. PRISM PRA
Several of the failure probabilities in the PRISM PRA have been scrutinized by the NRC in their
preapplication safety evaluation report (NUREG-1368). There are some differences in the PRA
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reviewed by the NRC and the PRA used in this report. The original 1986 draft is being used in
this work; the NRC reviewed a modified version from 1989 that has some substantial design
differences. In particular, scram failure frequencies on the order of 10-9 per demand are thought
to be overly optimistic. Additionally, the pump coastdown failure frequency on the order of 10~9
per reactor year, as well as the scram signal failure frequency on the order of 101 per demand,
have been questioned as being overly optimistic. Additionally, the initiating event frequency for
reactivity insertions at 104 per year was observed to be approximately two orders of magnitude
lower than typical LWR numbers. The decay heat removal system is a reactor vessel air cooling
system (RVACS) that directly removes heat from the reactor vessel. RVACS has a failure
probability around 108 depending on the initiator and the mission time. This failure probability
is justified by GE saying that RVACS is continuously operated and monitored. This would
allow operators to detect degradation before failure. There are no support systems necessary to
operate RVACS.
While the PRISM PRA is the only Level 3 assessment, the core response and containment
response trees are quite conservative. This can be attributed to several factors. First, the EBR-II
loss-of-flow experiments had not been performed and the estimated likelihood of eutectic
penetration in these transients is overestimated (assumed to be unity). In general, the
performance characteristics of metal fuel were not well understood. Secondly, the
containment/release response was originally done for oxide fuel and was modified in a
conservative manner to represent metal fuel. A larger source term and faster release rate were
used than for the oxide core.
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H.A.2. ALMR PRA
The ALMR PRA shares many similarities with the PRISM PRA as far as optimistic failure
frequencies are concerned. The RPS signal and rod insertion reliabilities are both fairly
optimistic and are around 10~8 per demand. There is a significant difference with respect to
seismic isolators and RVACS. The isolators are assumed to never fail in the ALMR PRA, while
in PRISM they are assumed to fail at 1.2g PGA. RVACS is assumed to always work with the
exception of large seismic initiators, but it has a fragility much greater than a typical PWR
containment; given an earthquake >2g a failure probability of 10- is used for RVACS. This is
significantly more reliable than the PRISM PRA which has a failure probability of 10- for
RVACS given an initiating earthquake of 1.2g PGA. Given this original estimate and no reason
that the isolators might be more robust, the failure probability used for RVACS in the ALMR
PRA seems particularly optimistic.
II.A.3. EBR-H PRA
The most immediate difference in the EBR-II PRA is the level of detail associated with a real
reactor. There are also some significant design differences between EBR-II and the GE designs.
The EBR-II (65 MWth) reactor is much smaller than the PRISM (-500 MWth) or ALMR (-800
MWth) designs. Another major difference is that the pumps for EBR-II are centrifugal pumps.
The PRA identified leakage of pump lubricant as a significant risk contributor. EBR-II is not
seismically isolated. The primary failure mode is that the hangers holding up the vessel fail
during a large (0.7g) seismic event. EBR-II also has a much more diverse set of internal events
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that are significant contributors to risk. Loss of flow, loss of offsite power, partial blockage, and
large reactivity insertion each contribute between 14% and 32% of the internal CDF. In
comparison, internal CDF is dominated in PRISM by loss of shutdown heat removal during a
long shutdown transient at over 90% of the internal CDF. For ALMR the internal risk is
dominated by a large reactivity insertion. If modified to include RVACS failure for internal
initiators using the PRISM reliability estimates, ALMR is also dominated by loss of shutdown
heat removal. For comparison to RVACS, the mean fragility of the passive heat removal system,
which is the most robust component in EBR-II, is 1.5g PGA. This is somewhere between the
PRISM estimate and the ALMR estimate.
III. FUNCTIONAL EVENT TREES
Functional event trees (FETs) have been developed in this work as a useful tool within the TNF.
FETs are event trees where the top events are major safety functions rather than particular
systems. There are several benefits to using functional trees as a tool. Different reactors can be
compared on a similar basis by using the same set of initiating events and the same top events.
The response of each design will be different. The frequency and consequences of each similar
sequence for two different designs will be dictated by the systems that perform each function.
Since a second PRA is to be constructed that contains only the safety grade systems, the FETs
present a tool where this selection can be made and the difference between choices can be
quickly calculated. LBEs are to be constructed by first binning together sequences with similar
phenomenology. The LBE then has the phenomenology of the sequence in the bin that most
challenges the system with the 9 5th percentile consequences (dose) of that sequence. The
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frequency of the LBE is the 9 5 th percentile of the most frequent sequence in the bin. Due to both
the binning of LBEs and the fact that not all systems need to be included in the PRA for
determining LBEs, a functional event tree approach becomes quite attractive.
III.A. Functional Top Events
Functional event trees for SFRs consist of four top events plus an initiating event (these events
may also be adequate to describe the safety functions of other reactor designs). The top events
being considered are (in order they appear as top events):
1. Shutdown
2. Fuel heat removal
3. Primary heat removal
4. Late shutdown
Shutdown consists of the signal to scram as well as the actual function of the scram system.
Because the results have similar phenomenology they may be binned for LBE purposes. Given a
failure of shutdown, the following probabilities would be weighted by the relative likelihood of
failure due to lack of signal and failure of insertion. For each given initiator this weighting is
typically very strongly towards one or the other. This action basically adds the probability of
both sequences, a conservative calculation. An alternative method is also explored where the
failure probability associated with the most common initiator in the group is used to determine
the top event failure probabilities.
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Fuel heat removal may vary by design, but it is the ability to have enough flow past the fuel
elements to remove heat. This may simply be pump coastdown for example. Primary heat
removal is the ability to remove the heat from the primary system to the environment. This
function may be carried out by a reactor vessel auxiliary cooling system, a direct removal
auxiliary cooling system, or any other type of heat removal system. Late shutdown consists of
functions designed to mitigate accidents that may not have initially shutdown. This may be
something like an operator recovering scram ability later or an ultimate shutdown late in a
transient overpower sequence where the first shutdown function failed
III.B. Initiating Events
Several initiators are considered based on the initiating events in the available PRAs:
1. Small reactivity insertion
2. Medium reactivity insertion
3. Large reactivity insertion
4. Local flow blockage
5. Loss of Offsite Power/Major Loss of flow
6. Shutdown Transients
7. Large Steam Generator Leak
8. Small seismic
9. Medium seismic
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10. Large seismic
Some other possible initiators are of interest such as a large steam line break. This initiator is a
major contributor to core damage in the EBR-II PRA but it is not considered in other reactor
SFR PRAs. Additional external initiators such as flood and fire may be considered in future
work.
Some initiators such as shutdown transients include all transients that force shutdown. This
means that the sum of all frequencies of shutdown initiator should be used. The failure
probabilities used for the top events is a weighted average of all the initiators grouped together.
The phenomenology is considered to be the most challenging of those initiators, for example:
pump trip is more challenging and would be used for phenomenology rather than spurious scram.
In an alternative method that is explored as more commensurate with the TNF, the most frequent
initiator of those grouped together is chosen as the initiating frequency and, as described earlier,
determines the failure probability of the top events.
In the design phase, FETs allow one to compare the performance of two different systems
designed to perform the same safety functions. This system change assessment has been
performed for the ALMR design where a DRACS has been put in place of the RVACS. This
change turns out to be fairly minor, as both DRACS and RVACS are found to be approximately
equal in reliability.
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Although a more detailed PRA would be necessary to show compliance with the TNF, the initial
results show that the SFRs tend to have few small release sequences. Figure 2 shows a map of
where the LBEs for ALMR, PRISM, and an LWR fall on the F-C curve. Sequences on the left
axis have no dose but are plotted at 0.001 rem for conveinience.
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Figure 2. Plot of LBE location on the F-C Curve for several reactors.
When failure leads to a dose, it is rare, and usually very large. This is not very different from the
pattern seen for the LWR, though the calculated frequencies are lower for the SFR. The
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dominant failure mode found in this review of PRAs is failure of decay heat removal during a
long transient. Energetic events, which have been the focus of multiple sodium reactor designs,
are found to occur only very rarely. The addition of a third scram system, fuel streaming
channels, or other features meant to mitigate or prevent these rare events would have no impact
with regards to meeting the goals of the TNF.
Seismic events are found to be a dominant contributor to the failure of the decay heat removal
system. This is further investigated in Chapter V.
IV. IMPORTANCE MEASURES
Importance measures have played an important role in some risk-informed regulations such as
10CFR50.69. In this approach, structures, systems, and components (SSCs) are categorized
based on the importance measures Risk Achievement Worth (RAW) and Fussell-Vesely (F-V).
These measures are useful in determining the relative importance of SSCs with an integrated risk
measure such as core damage frequency. These importance measures, on their own, do not
provide useful information to designers with regards to which SSCs may be suited for
simplification or improvement based on the margin between the calculated risk for the system
design as is and a safety goal.
RAWtreshold was developed by Reinert and Apostolakis to address this issue (Reinert and
Apostolakis 2006). This method allows a designer to know the threshold value of RAW for a
system such that if it were removed from the design, the safety goal would no longer be met.
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Using this method and a surrogate risk metric composed of the sum frequency of all LBEs with a
dose greater than 500 rem, it is found that pump coastdown and heat removal via the balance of
plant are of low risk-significance to both the PRISM and ALMR designs.
A new importance measure, Limit Exceedance Factor (LEF), has been developed to better
address the issue of measuring the margin available for each SSC as it relates to the overall
system. LEF is defined as the factor the failure probability of a system can be multiplied by such
that the total risk of the system is equal to a limit. LEF can be applied to the same traditional
cumulative risk metrics that have been used for standard importance measures. More
importantly, though, it has been developed to be compatible with LBEs and the TNF. It provides
useful information where traditional importance measures cannot when risk is being measured on
a per sequence basis.
The signal to scram and insertion of the rods were both identified as having a good deal of failure
probability margin. This is in contrast to the high importance these systems appear to have when
ranked using RAW. This comparison can easily be seen in tables 3 and 4. The three systems not
shown in table 5 do not have a value for LEF. This is because these systems could have a failure
probability of unity and the safety goals of the TNF would still be met.
It is interesting to note that LEF tends to rank major contributors more highly than RAW. This is
because of the less extreme nature of the importance measure. To assume that a system will be
in the failed state is a very rough way to make importance calculations, especially for systems
such as the signal to scram and the insertion of the rods.
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Table 3. RAW values for top level systems in the PRISM reactor design. Ordered from
most important to least important.
System RAW
(Energetic Release)
Reactor Shutdown System (scram) 5.8E7
Reactor Vessel Air Cooling System (RVACS) 1.8E5
Shutdown Heat Removal through the Intermediate Heat 1.4E4
Transfer System
Reactor Protection System /Plant Control System Signal 1.1E3
Pump Costdown 4.0
Nominal Inherent Reactivity Feedback 4.0
Operating Power Heat Removal 1.0
Table 4. LEF values for systems where the RAW value is greater than RAWthreshold-
Ordered from most important to least important.
System LEF (Energetic Release)
Shutdown Heat Removal through Intermediate Heat 240
Transfer System
Reactor Vessel Air Cooling System (RVACS) 250
Reactor Shutdown System (scram) 460
Reactor Protection System /Plant Control System Signal 2.5E8
V. SEISMIC RISK WITHIN THE TNF
Seismic risk dominates the total risk in all of the SFR PRAs reviewed. Seismic requirements for
nuclear power plants within the United States have historically been the result of a negotiation
between the applicant and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The NRC and the
applicant rely on engineering judgment and knowledge of seismic activity at the site to determine
both the Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) and the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE).
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The OBE according to 1OCFR50 Appendix S is "the vibratory ground motion for which those
features of the nuclear power plant necessary for continued operation without undue risk to the
health and safety of the public will remain functional. The operating basis earthquake ground
motion is only associated with plant shutdown and inspection unless specifically selected by the
applicant as a design input."
The SSE is "the vibratory ground motion for which certain structures, systems, and components
must be designed to remain functional." The SSE is to be at least 0.lg peak ground acceleration
(PGA) and the OBE is typically one third of the SSE acceleration. Typical PGA values of SSEs
for plants east of the Rocky Mountains range from 0.lg to 0.25g and the PGA values for plants
west of the Rocky Mountains range from 0.25g to 0.75g. For comparison, the Niigataken
Chuetsu-Okiearthquake was measured at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa site in Japan to have a PGA
between 0.69g-0.83g.
Under the TNF approach all sequences with a mean frequency of 10-7 per year or more must be
fully evaluated and must meet the F-C curve. This presents a problem in itself as most reactor
sites have not quantified the seismic hazard to such low probabilities. Most SSEs have an annual
probability of exceedance of around 10-4 to 105 . With no evidence found that there is a physical
upper bound to peak ground accelerations (PGA), an unbounded extrapolation of an existing
hazard curve is used to demonstrate the methods and the potential problems associated with this
type of treatment.
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Some methods for seismic initiating event selection are proposed in this work as there is no
specific guidance within the TNF. A conservative method where the initiators are selected from
points above the seismic hazard curve and a method where initiators are selected as points on the
hazard curve are analyzed. An example of this method is shown in Figure 3. In either method,
the exceedance frequency is used as an initiating frequency, and the associated acceleration is
used as the initiating acceleration.
Due to the very high level of conservatism involved in choosing points above the hazard curve,
points on the curve are used. For example, these points may correspond to where the dotted lines
intersect the hazard curve. Additionally this allows us to plot the effect of choosing any given
point along the curve as the seismic initiator. Apart from the FETs, a short seismic event tree
(Figure 4) is used to demonstrate the implications of including seismic initiators at frequencies as
low as 10-7 per year.
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Figure 3. Schematic of LBE initiator selection. The stars show the initiating event
frequency and acceleration chosen when conservatively using a point above the hazard
curve. The dashed lines represent the limiting frequency and acceleration for the interval
the initiating event is supposed to cover. Initiating events may also be selected from the
curve itself. For example, points where the dashed line intersects the hazard curve may be
used.
In this small event tree model, it is assumed that plant failure (using a overall plant fragility) and
failure of containment is sufficient to have a release that exceeds 500 rem as the 95 1 percentile
consequence. The results of this model with a typical LWR fragility are shown in Figure 4. The
solid line is the extrapolated hazard curve from the Clinton site. The dashed lines show the large
release frequency given either a hardened containment or a confinement building.
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Figure 4. A simple event tree for seismic risk assessment. End states
(CD), and large release (LR).
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Figure 5. Peak Ground Acceleration vs. Frequency. The dotted horizontal line highlights
the 10~' per year cutoff of the TNF. The thin double line shows the frequency cutoff that
would allow a plant with containment to be licensed.
The least frequent seismic initiator that can be considered while still meeting the TNF goal is
shown by the double thin line. It shows the intersection of the 10-7 per year goal and the large
release frequency for a reactor with containment. This is then extended to the hazard curve
vertically to find the associated initiating frequency. It is observed that this is in the range of
typical SSE frequencies of around 10~4 to 10- per year. The optimism used in the ALMR and
28
1.E-01 -
1.E-02
1.E-03 -
1.E-04 -
0
1.E-05 -
1.E-06 -
1.E-07 w
1.E-08 -
a-
& 1.E-09 
--
1.E-10 -
0.1 0.2 0.4 0.8 1.6 3.2 6.4
Peak Ground Acceleration (g)
PRISM seismic risk analysis has been previously noted. If it is instead assumed that the SFR has
a fragility equal to the decay heat removal component in the EBR-II seismic risk analysis, the
same short event tree method can be used to show the results for an SFR. It turns out that the
decay heat removal system is the least fragile component in the EBR-II PRA. The system has
only a slightly higher fragility than that of a typical LWR. Considering this property and that
SFRs are also vulnerable to seismic reactivity insertions, an SFR should have about the same
level of plant fragility as a typical LWR. Since the analysis done is not of sufficient detail to do
a better assessment, it is noted that the analysis done applies to both typical LWRs and SFRs.
One major feature of both the ALMR and PRISM designs is seismic isolation. This system is
designed to prevent damage to the nuclear island. To model what the effect might be on the
large release frequency, a fragility curve has been assigned to the isolation system based on the
maximum capacity of 1.2g peak ground acceleration cited in the PRISM PRA. The basis for this
limit is not immediately clear. As such analysis has been done using 1.2g as the 1 0 th, median,
and 9 0 th percentile values of a lognormal distribution. Figure 6 illustrates this effect for a reactor
with a confinement building and isolation. It is assumed that the isolation must fail for the plant
to fail and that failure of the plant, confinement, and isolation are independent events. It is
observed that for the most optimistic estimate isolation with confinement has a similar large
release frequency as a non-isolated building with a hardened containment.
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Figure 6. The frequency of large release for a typical reactor with isolation and a
confinement building. Each curve represents a different calculation of the isolation system
fragility curve. The fragility for the isolation is defined by assigning 1.2g to the percentile
failure shown in the legend and /1=0.5.
A solution that is not immediately compatible with the TNF is to treat seismic sequences
differently than internally initiated sequences. This would be done be using an initiating event
frequency limit of 10-5 per year. This value is chosen primarily due to the precedence of current
practices. It was noted previously, that SSEs have a frequency of about 10-5 per year. In
addition to this, a previous version of the TNF binned sequences according to their frequency.
"Rare" initiators with a frequency of less than 10~5 per year were not necessarily required to meet
any further mitigation. Finally, the rule being considered on the transition break size (TBS) sets
the size based on which pipes fail with a frequency less than 10-5 per year. Those breaks rarer
than this would be beyond design basis accidents and would not have the same requirements as
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breaks smaller than the TBS. This cutoff would make typical plants able to meet the TNF goals
and would allow for the tradeoff between isolation and hardened containment to be analyzed.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In implementing the TNF with existing SFR PRAs, several key conclusions have been reached:
" The review of the ALMR and PRISM PRAs revealed that several of the failure
probabilities are quite optimistic, i.e., they are too low.
" As completed, the ALMR and PRISM PRAs show these designs comply with the TNF
for internal events (PWRs do not comply). Even if PWR numbers are used for scram and
pump seizure, this result is unchanged.
" A more detailed and realistic PRA that includes fire (and other) initiators is necessary
before it is attempted to satisfy the TNF.
" A prescriptive approach to LBE construction such as functional event trees is a useful
development to prevent applicants from arbitrarily splitting sequences to arrive at
apparently lower frequencies.
" Although core disruptive accidents are found to be well below the TNF cutoff, there is
still a concern that this accident could be used as the deterministic LBE, thus negating the
benefit of the very low frequencies associated with these accidents.
* Traditional risk metrics are not compatible with LBEs.
" Limit exceedance factor is a new measure designed to be used with the TNF or other
quantitative risk metrics and reveals that some systems thought to be important using
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other importance measures may have a significant amount of margin. Signal to scram
and pump coastdown are two examples of systems that would traditionally be considered
of high risk-significance that LEF identifies as candidates for simplification.
e Typical designs of SFRs cannot meet the TNF due to the requirement of including
sequences initiated by very rare earthquakes. This conclusion also holds for PWRs.
e Seismologists do not quantify seismic risk to very low frequencies. Extrapolation reveals
that these rare accelerations seismic events may have huge accelerations.
e It is recommended that a frequency cutoff be established for external events, as these
events may pose a significant threat to all systems and may not be practical to design
against.
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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION
Sodium cooled fast reactors (SFRs) are a mature reactor technology. Experimental and
prototype SFRs have been constructed and operated in several countries for more than 60 years.
Some of the notable reactors that have operated or operating are EBR-I, FFTF, Phenix,
Superphenix, BN-350, BN-600, Joyo, and Monju. Several reactors are planned for construction,
mostly outside of the United States with the exception of the Toshiba 4S. They have been
considered an option for both running a closed fuel cycle and actinide management for legacy
waste (AFCI/GEN IV).
Some important operating characteristics set SFRs apart from LWRs. A higher operating
temperature (-500 'C compared to -300 C) gives the SFR a higher thermal efficiency. A long
thermal response time gives operators and safety systems more time to perform corrective
actions. A large margin to coolant boiling means that boiling crises are not of importance. A
low pressure primary system means less stress on the piping and that leaks may not have an
immediate pressurizing effect within the containment structure. No emergency electricity
generators are needed as the passive response and decay heat removal are sufficient to survive
loss of offsite power transients. A positive void coefficient is one of the main safety issues that
SFRs must face that LWRs do not. Postulated accidents, often initiated through some sort of
postulated coolant voiding, called core disruptive accidents (CDAs) have been considered as
something SFRs should be able to prevent, or respond to (GIF 2002). In a CDA, a large amount
of energy may be released which would not only cause major damage to the core but would also
pose a serious threat to the primary boundary.
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In this thesis, the focus is on pool type SFRs. In the pool type SFR design, the primary sodium is
contained within the reactor vessel. An intermediate heat exchanger, which sits in the pool of
primary sodium, takes the heat into the secondary sodium loop. This prevents radioactive
sodium from interacting with water. The secondary sodium is then sent to the steam generator to
produce steam for the power cycle Figure I. 1.
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Figure 1.1. Pool type SFR (US DOE 2002).
In particular there is a focus on the ALMR and PRISM conceptual designs. General Electric
developed both of these designs to a fairly detailed level. They share many characteristics. Both
rectors are metallic fueled, operate with a core outlet temperature of 510 "C, utilize
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electromagnetic pumps, and rely on passive features to respond to most transients. They both
use a Reactor Vessel Air Cooling System (RVACS) to remove decay heat. PRISM is a smaller
design at less than 500 MWth. ALMR is larger, coming in at about 800 MWth.
Some major differences in the designs considered came from the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) review of the PRISM Preliminary Safety Information Document. PRISM
was faulted for having only a single method to shutdown the reactor as the reactivity feedback
that shuts the reactor down as the temperature rises was not considered to be a sufficient
secondary shutdown mechanism. Additionally, the PRISM design has no containment, which
the NRC deemed unacceptable. As a result, the ALMR includes Gas Expansion Modules
(GEMs) which shutdown the reactor when there is a loss of flow by increasing the neutron
leakage, a secondary ultimate shutdown system that drops neutron absorbing balls into the
reactor, and a small metal containment dome that is attached to the containment vessel. These
added safety features have some operational drawbacks. Further discussion is beyond the scope
of the thesis.
Historically, SFRs have been considered to be more expensive per MWe than traditional light
water reactors (LWRs). This has been primarily due to the poor capacity factor experiences at
some sites such as SuperPhenix and Monju. Other reasons for the higher cost include more
expensive components and difficult inspection, as sodium is opaque. Experimental reactors,
which are known to be more expensive than commercial reactors, are also the primary
experience for SFRs. Another major reason in the United States, and the focus of this thesis, is
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that the licensing process has been difficult for SFRs. This resulted most notably in the huge
cost overrun of the Clinch River Breeder Reactor (CRBR) project.
L.A Current Regulations
l0CFR50, the current set of licensing regulations, is generally designed for use with LWRs.
Many of the General Design Criteria (GDC) do not necessarily apply to SFRs or other advanced
reactor designs. In NUREG-1368, the Preliminary Safety Evaluation Report (PSER) for the
PRISM reactor, the NRC agreed with General Electric (GE) that, for the PRISM SFR, LOCAs
are not an accident of concern. There was some disagreement on which of the GDCs might
apply, but both parties agreed that many of them would have required modification. These
differences are noted in Table I.A. 1. One important takeaway is that many of the GDCs either
need to be modified for SFRs or do not apply. The other important takeaway is that for many of
the GDCs, the applicant and the regulator do not agree on how they should be modified. This
type of uncertainty in regulation makes design a difficult process.
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Table I.A.2. GDC Applicability to PRISM Design (USNRC 1994).
In LWR licensing, best engineering judgment and defense-in-depth play central roles in guiding
regulations. There are no specific frequencies mentioned in the regulations but there are some
guidelines. For example, anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs) are expected to happen at
least once during the life of the plant. These include frequent events such as turbine trip and loss
of offsite power. In addition, design basis accidents include an anticipated operational
occurrence as well as a single failure of a major safety system. The single failure is also
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GDC Categories Stafr Evaluations by Preapplicant Proposal
GDC Number by GDC Number
GDC directly 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 11, 12, 13,
applicable 16", 18, 20, 21, 22, 24, 29, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22V
30, 32, 42, 43, 52, 53, 54, 56, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30, 31, 32,
60, 62, and 63 34, 38, 40, 52, 53, 54, 56, 60,
61, 62, 63, 64
GDC applicable but 4, 15, 17, 19, 23, 25, 26"', 27, 4, 19, 27, 28, 39, 50, and 51
needing changes 28, 31, 34M, 36, 37, 38, 39,
40, 41,44, 45,46, 50, 51, 55,
57, 61, and 64
GDC not applicable 33" and 35 33, 35, 36, 37, 41, 42, 43, 44,
45, 46, 55, and 57
Possible additional Sections 3.2.4.1, 3.2.4.2, and None
criteria 3.2.4.6
GDC for which the NRC 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14,
staff agrees with the 16', 18, 20, 21, 22, 24, 29,
preapplicant 30, 32, 35, 39, 51, 52, 53, 54,
56,60,62, and 63
GDC for which the NRC 4, 15, 17, 19, 23, 25, 26", 27,
staff requests the 28, 31, 331, 34n, 36, 37, 38,
preapplicant to address 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 50,
changes to its position on 55, 57, 61, and 64
the GDC I I
[* - An alternative to GDC 33 is discussed under that GDC.
[) - The NRC staff position on GDC 16, 26, and 34 may be changed by the
Commission, see Sections on those GDC.
implicitly limited in frequency as failure of the pressure vessel is not considered as part of the
design basis and the frequency is typically considered to be less than 10-6 and is estimated to be
around 10~8 per year. On the other hand, a break in the largest pipe in the system is considered a
design basis accident and is expected to happen only marginally more frequently than vessel
failure.
The current US SFR licensing knowledge has come about from the Clinch River Breeder Reactor
(CRBR) and the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor (ALMR) program interactions with the NRC.
In the 1970s and early 1980s, licensing was initiated for the CRBR but funding was cut before a
construction permit was issued due to major cost overruns. Core Disruptive Accidents (CDAs)
have been a licensing issue for SFRs and particularly caused problems in the licensing of the
Clinch River Breeder Reactor (CRBR). These accidents were originally postulated as a sudden
voiding of the reactor core. This inserts a large amount of positive reactivity and can cause
energetic disassembly of the reactor core. This accident was not considered as a design basis
accident but was a driving force causing the designers to change the core layout to reduce the
energetics of such postulated events. Other preventative and mitigating measures were also
included in the design to address CDAs (Strawbridge and Clare 1985).
Although core disruptive accidents (CDAs) were not considered as part of the design basis for
CRBR, a large amount of regulatory attention was given to these accidents which prolonged the
licensing process (Ivans, 2006). The CRBR licensing process did result in a Safety Evaluation
Report in 1983, NUREG-0968.
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In an attempt to avoid the regulatory delays associated with addressing CDAs, the ALMR design
incorporated additional passive safety measures in an evolution of the PRISM design including
GEMs and an ultimate shutdown system. Under the ALMR program, the DOE submitted a
Preliminary Safety Information Document (PSID) to the NRC in 1986 (the PRISM design) and
the NRC in turn issued a Preliminary Safety Evaluation Report (PSER) in 1994. As a result of
this interaction, the NRC forced changes to the PRISM reactor including the adoption of a
containment dome and the addition of an ultimate shutdown system and gas expansion modules
(GEMs) to satisfy defense-in-depth concerns (Ivans, 2006).
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CHAPTER H - THE TECHNOLOGY NEUTRAL FRAMEWORK
The NRC Office of Research has published NUREG-1860, a study on the feasibility of a risk-
informed performance-based licensing framework. This framework is referred to in this thesis as
the Technology Neutral Framework (TNF). It is important to note that it is not a regulation and
will almost certainly be changed before final implementation. PBMR (Pty) Ltd. has proposed a
risk-informed performance based licensing strategy to the NRC, though not specifically
NUREG- 1860. The NRC has deferred any rulemaking until the pre-application reaches a further
level of detail. Similarly, the NRC plans to test the TNF in parallel with a separate licensing
structure for the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) (or any other High Temperature Gas
Reactor design certification or Combined License application) in which LWR licensing
requirements will be modified. It is noted that this modification of LWR requirements may be
just as difficult and burdensome for NGNP as it was for SFR designs. If the TNF were to be
used, there would be more regulatory certainty about what performance would be adequate. This
would lead to LWRs having less of an advantage merely due to historical licensing procedures.
In the TNF, PRA methods play a central role in determining licensing basis events (LBEs) which
take the place of traditional DBAs. Within the TNF approach, accident sequences are grouped
according to similar phenomenology and consequences. The limits set in NUREG-1860 are on a
per-LBE basis (Figure 11.1).
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Figure 11.1. The F-C Curve (USNRC 2007).
LBEs with a high frequency of occurrence must have low consequences to be acceptable. LBEs
with a low frequency are allowed to have higher consequences. All sequences within the PRA
and all LBEs must lie below the frequency-consequence curve (F-C curve). This curve has been
developed to be commensurate or more conservative than current NRC and EPA regulations.
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Appendix H of the TNF describes which portions of 1OCFR50 are applicable within the
framework.
The process for LBE selection described in Chapter 6 of the TNF as follows:
1. Modify the PRA to credit only those mitigating functions that are considered to be
safety significant.
2. Determine the point estimate frequency for each resulting event sequence from the
quantification of the modified PRA.
3. For sequences with point estimate frequencies equal to or greater than Jx10 8 per year,
determine the mean and 95th percentile frequency.
4. Identify all PRA event sequences with a [mean or] 95th percentile frequency > 1x10-7
per year. Event sequences with [mean or]" 95th percentile frequencies less than 1x10 7
per year are excluded from further consideration.
5. Group the PRA event sequences with a 95th frequency percentile > Jx10~7 per year
into event classes.
6. Select an event sequence from the event class that represents the bounding
consequence.
7. Establish the LBE'sfrequencyfor a given event class.
8. Bin each LBE into one of three frequencies ranges: Frequent, Infrequent or Rare.
9. Determine the total weighted annual frequencies for all events equal to or greater than
1x10-2 and lx103.
10. Verify that the selected LBEs meet the deterministic and probabilistic acceptance
criteria.
There is an apparent inconsistency in NUREG-1 860. In the main body of the report, a sequence with a mean
frequency of less than 10-7 per year is not included in the licensing basis. However, in an appendix to the report,
sequences are not included in the licensing basis if the 95th percentile frequency is less than 10 7 per year. One of
the authors of the report, J. Lehner of Brookhaven National Laboratory, was consulted and he confirmed that the 10-
7 cutoff is to apply to mean values.
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The LBE representing a group of sequences is assigned the 9 5th percentile frequency of the most
likely sequence in the group (step 7) and the 9 5 'h percentile consequence from the worst (or most
challenging) consequence sequence in the group (step 6). The systems whose performance is
required to keep the LBEs below the F-C curve are categorized as safety related and must
conform to the special treatment requirements of safety-related systems.
The lowest frequency considered, as seen in Figure II. 1, is 10-7 per reactor year. NUREG- 1860
specifies that LBEs with a mean frequency less than 10-7 per reactor year "are screened from the
process". In addition, the report advises to "Drop all PRA sequences with point estimate
frequency < 1.E-8 per year. (USNRC 2007)"iii
The TNF also includes deterministic requirements for the probabilistically selected LBEs. One
example from these requirements is that a certain number of barriers remaining to fission product
release must remain intact depending on the frequency of the sequence. The table for
deterministic requirements is reproduced here as Table II.1. Further deterministic criteria are
detailed in Appendix G and Appendix J of the TNF. These are with regards to the specific
defense-in-depth criteria mentioned in the TNF: physical protection, stable operation, protective
systems, barrier integrity, and protective actions.
One notable element of the defense-in-depth requirements is that a traditional LWR containment
is not imposed, and that another event may pose the design basis for a controlled low-leakage
barrier. Events mentioned in the TNF for SFRs are: flow blockage in the core, large sodium fire,
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" The notation 1.E-8 means lx10-.
and loss of normal heat removal in conjunction with poor quality fuel. This final event (loss of
heat removal) is a major contributor to large release as analyzed in Chapter 3.
Table 11.1. Deterministic criteria for probabilistic LBEs (USNRC 2007)
frequent
( 10-2)
no barrier failure (beyond the initiating event)
no impact on fuel integrity or lifetime and safety analysis assumptions
redundant means for reactor shutdown and decay heat removal remain functional
annual dose to a receptor at the EAB s 5mrem TEDE
infrequent - maintain containment functional capability
* a coolable geometry is maintained
(< 1 0-2 to - at least one means of reactor shutdown and decay heat removal remains
210-') functional
- for LBEs with frequency > 1 E-3 annual dose to a receptor at the EAB 100mrem
TEDE
- for LBEs with frequency < 1 E-3 the worst two-hour dose at the EAB, and the dose
from the duration of the accident at the outer boundary of the LPZ, meet the F-C
curve
rare - the worst two-hour dose at the EAB, and the dose from the duration of the
(<1 0-5 to accident at the outer boundary of the LPZ, meet the F-C curve
10-)
A final deterministic requirement is that a deterministic LBE is to be negotiated between the
licensee and the regulator. This event is to represent "a serious challenge to fission product
retention in the fuel and coolant system."
There is a parallel set of requirements within the TNF for security. These goals are set such that
different qualitative threats of high, medium, and low are assigned probabilities of occurrence.
The applicant is then supposed to show that the conditional threat for these groups meets the
quantitative health objectives (QHOs). However, there is not a great deal of guidance as to how
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this should be accomplished. Diversion scenarios are included as part of the security threat and
are to meet the requirements of lOCFR73.
The primary change from IOCFR50 to the TNF that this thesis focuses on is that LBEs, which
are actual sequences determined for each plant design, take the place of postulated DBAs. DBAs
do not take frequencies into account. A major feature is that there is a stated frequency cutoff for
events that are within the licensing basis. This is an important point for SFRs as a designer may
argue that CDAs lie far below this cutoff. This could potentially prevent excessive regulatory
attention to these very rare events.
II.A. Review of the Available PRAs
Using the TNF requires PRA availability. The available PRAs for pool type SFRs are for
PRISM (Hackford 1986), EBR-II (Hill, Ragland, and Roglans-Ribas 1991), and ALMR (El-
Sheikh 1994). ALMR and PRISM are both pool type reactors that are less than a gigawatt
thermal. The PRAs for PRISM and ALMR were performed by GE staff. The detail of these
documents reflects the fact that these designs are in the conceptual phase. The PRISM PRA is
Level 3 while the ALMR PRA is only Level 1. The PRA for EBR-II is thorough and similar to
other modem Level 1 PRAs in detail. All of the PRAs include seismic initiators with only EBR-
II including fire initiators. There are some features that all of the PRAs share in common. All of
the reactors are assessed to have internally initiated core damage frequencies below typical
GEN-II PWRs. Additionally the risk for each of these designs is dominated by seismic initiators.
This information is summarized in Table 11.2. Finally all of the PRAs include only point
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estimates for all events. Error factors of three and five have been applied uniformly to see the
impact uncertainties might have on LBE acceptance.
Table 11.2. Core Damage Frequency Summary
Design Internal CDF (per year) Seismic Initiated CDF
EBR-II 2x10-6  2x10-
PRISM 1x10~8  5x10-
ALMR 1x10 10 3x10 6
II.A.1. PRISM PRA
Several of the failure probabilities in the PRISM PRA have been scrutinized by the NRC in their
preapplication safety evaluation report (NUREG-1368). These can be seen specifically in the
Funtional Event Trees presented in Appendix B. There are some differences in the PRA
reviewed by the NRC and the PRA used in this report. The version used in this thesis is the
original 1986 draft, the NRC reviewed a modified version from 1989 that has some substantial
design differences. In particular, scram failure frequencies on the order of 10-9 per demand are
thought to be overly optimistic. Additionally, the pump coastdown failure frequency on the
order of 10-9 per reactor year, as well as the scram signal failure frequency on the order of 1011
per demand, have been questioned as being overly optimistic. The NRC also finds the vessel
failure frequency of 10-13 per year to be low.
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Vessel failure is included in the 1986 draft at 10-7 per year, which actually seems pessimistic.
LWRs typically use a value of around 10-8 per year for vessel failure. Since the SFR has a low
pressure primary, this value should be lower. In any event, it is unusual to include vessel failure
as an initiating event in a PRA. Justification of any of the failure probabilities is difficult as
there is little operating experience with many of the components. Electromagnetic pumps have
not been used on the scale of PRISM. Synchronous coastdown motors are not a necessary
component for centrifugal pumps, and they have not been used in any existing designs.
On top of some optimistic failure frequencies, the initiating event frequency for reactivity
insertions at 10-4 per year was observed to be approximately two orders of magnitude lower than
typical LWR numbers. RVACS has a failure probability around 10~8 depending on the initiator
and the mission time. This failure probability is justified by GE saying that RVACS is
continuously operated and monitored. This would allow operators to detect degradation before
failure. There are no support systems necessary to operate RVACS.
Many of these estimates are likely the result of insufficient detail to put together fault trees for
many of the systems. There are only a few fault trees included in the PRA, and they are typically
very short. For rod insertion, failure consists of an or gate with the independent failure of six
basic events "rod fails to insert," and the basic event "common cause failure of all rods to insert."
There is a distinct lack of detail on how the rods fail to insert.
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All initiating events in the PRISM PRA have the same Level 1 top event responses. These are
covered in more detail in Chapter III. This gives the PRA a largely parallel structure that is not
commonly used. Each initiator typically has specific responses to that initiator as the top events.
While the PRISM PRA is the only Level 3 assessment, the core response and containment
response trees are quite conservative. This can be attributed to several factors. First, the EBR-II
loss-of-flow experiments had not been performed and the estimated likelihood of eutectic
penetration in these transients is overestimated (assumed to be unity). Many other probabilities
in the core response and containment event trees are 0.5, 0.9, and 0.1. There is not much effort
given in the PRA to justify these numbers. This leads to the conclusion that there was not a great
deal of knowledge regarding the mechanistic responses that would take place. In general the
performance characteristics of metal fuel were not well understood. Secondly, the core response
and containment/release response were originally performed for oxide fuel and were then
modified in a conservative manner to represent metal fuel. For the release response, a larger
source term and faster release rate were used than for the oxide core.
II.A.2. ALMR PRA
The ALMR PRA shares many similarities with the PRISM PRA as far as optimistic failure
frequencies. The RPS signal and rod insertion reliabilities are both fairly optimistic and are
around 10~8 per demand. RVACS is assumed to always succeed for non-seismic initiators. The
event trees do not have a parallel format and credit specific combinations of responses for given
initiators. For example, the number of rods inserted after an anticipated transient overpower
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determines the number of pump coastdown motors that must succeed, and thus the failure
probability for several branches in the event trees. More fault trees, of greater detail have been
used to estimate some of the failure frequencies.
One major issue with the ALMR PRA is that some event trees are apparently missing. Partial
flow blockage is listed as an initiating event, but the event tree that should show the response of
the plant to this event is missing. Functional event trees have been used to create an appropriate
response tree for this initiating event.
There is a significant difference with respect to seismic isolators and RVACS. The isolators are
assumed to never fail in the ALMR PRA, where in PRISM they are assumed to fail at 1.2g PGA.
RVACS is assumed to always work with the exception of large seismic initiators, where it has a
fragility much greater than a typical PWR containment; given an earthquake >2g a failure
probability of 10~5 is used for RVACS. Compare this to the results of Chapter V and it is clear
that this is an optimistic estimate. This is significantly more reliable than PRISM PRA which
has a failure probability of 10-1 for RVACS given an initiating earthquake of 1.2g PGA.
II.A.3. EBR-II PRA
The most immediate difference from the PRISM and ALMR PRA in the EBR-II PRA is the level
of detail associated with a real reactor. Each initiator has specific top events meant to mitigate
the effects of that initiator. There are over 700 pages of fault trees. There are many more basic
events, and there was an actual operating history that allows the frequency of failures to be
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updated using the statistical evidence. There is also a fine granularity for the core damage states
including possible experimental damage, minor core damage, core damage, and structural
damage. While the PRISM and ALMR PRAs have several core damage states, they are
differentiated more or less on the percentage of core melt.
There are also some significant design differences between EBR-II and the GE designs. The
EBR-II reactor is much smaller than the PRISM or ALMR designs at around sixty megawatts
thermal. This leads to a smaller thermal inertia and an added initiator that presents a threat to the
reactor. For a steam line break, there is sufficient cooling and fast enough response in the core
inlet temperature that an overcooling accident is possible. Another major difference is that the
pumps for EBR-II are centrifugal pumps. The PRA identified leakage of pump lubricant as a
significant risk contributor. EBR-II is not seismically isolated. The primary failure mode is that
the hangers holding up the vessel fail during a large (0.7g) seismic event.
EBR-II also has a much more diverse set of internal events that are significant contributors to
risk. Loss of flow, loss of offsite power, partial blockage, and large reactivity insertion each
contribute between 14% and 32% of the internal CDF. In comparison, internal CDF is
dominated in PRISM by loss of shutdown heat removal during a long shutdown transient at over
90% of the internal CDF. For ALMR the internal risk is dominated by a large reactivity
insertion. If modified to include RVACS failure for internal initiators using the PRISM reliability
estimates, ALMR is also dominated by loss of shutdown heat removal. For comparison to
RVACS, the mean fragility of the passive heat removal system, which is the most robust
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This is somewhere between the PRISM estimate and the
ALMR estimate.
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component in EBR-II, is 1.5g PGA.
CHAPTER III - FUNCTIONAL EVENT TREES
Functional Event Trees (FETs) have been developed as a tool for several purposes. The first
purpose is that it allows one to compare different reactor designs on an equal basis. The second
purpose is that it provides a framework in which LBEs can be constructed. This type of
framework is important to have within the TNF. As proposed, it is up to the applicant to decide
what separates one sequence from another sufficiently that they are two different sequences.
This could lead to an applicant splitting certain failures into multiple equally likely branches to
reduce the frequency. For example, one could take each one centimeter segment along all the
piping and refer to each break as a different initiator. Alternatively one could make many
branches out of each attempt to recover a system over a time period. This would make each
sequence of a lower frequency, but it would not actually improve the safety of the reactor.
Forcing the applicant to use certain functional events as the initiators and top events would
prevent this particular method of gaming the system.
FETs also put passive systems on the same footing as complex active systems that perform the
same function. The same total failure probability for a function may be due to a single system in
a passively safe system, but could be due to the failure of many different systems in an active
design. If applicants are able to split up the failure of each different active subsystem into
different events, it would be easier for a complex active system with the same functional failure
probability to meet the TNF goal than for a passively safe system to meet the TNF goal. For
example, consider an active system which has four trains that each have three different failure
modes to provide decay heat removal, and a passive system only has two systems for decay heat
removal and a single failure mode. The active system could split a total loss of decay heat
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removal across twelve different sequences, where the passive system can only spread it across
two. This can be seen as giving a benefit to defense-in-depth measures but could get out of hand.
The TNF recommends there be a limit on the sum frequency of sequences in the "frequent",
"infrequent", and "rare" categories. A specific example on implementing this recommendation
is not provided.
The functional event trees have been constructed in the computer codes SAPHIRE and CAFTA
that allow one to easily group similar events together. This is particularly useful given that most
of the event trees arising from different initiating events have the same top events. Initiators
have been grouped together that cause similar plant response and have similar phenomenology.
The PRISM PRA has twenty-one initiators. These have been reduced to ten using best judgment
as to which initiators have the same type of phenomenology. This is not meant to be a definitive
list of initiators, but it does cover all of the major contributors of the available PRAs. Certainly
in a full application of the TNF, fire initiators would also need to be considered.
A generic initiator is assigned to the frequency of the most common of the initiators in the group
and the most challenging phenomenology. This phenomenology determines the failure
probability of the top events in the functional event trees. Only point estimates have been used
in this analysis. This is primarily because events below 10~7 per reactor year are being screened.
Actual LBEs selected in this process would require an uncertainty analysis and assurance that the
F-C curve is met by the 95th percentile frequency as well as the 9 5th percentile consequences for
sequences with a mean greater than 10-7 .
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Table III. 1 displays the initiator grouping for the generic initiators for the PRISM design. The
generic initiator is then given the initiating frequency of the top original initiator and the
phenomenology of the bold-faced original initiator. For example, the Shutdown Transient
initiator has the phenomenology of IHTS pump failure and a frequency of 0.5 per year. Some
PRISM initiating events arise from a conservative extrapolation of a probabilistic fracture
mechanics analysis applied to the reactor vessel. These values are not similar to other estimates
of vessel failure probability, especially for a low pressure system. These initiating events have
not been included in the analysis. These initiating frequencies are found to be much higher than
those cited in the ALMR and EBR-II PRAs. This method is consistent with grouping the
sequences from the PRISM PRA.
Table 111.1. PRISM Initiator Grouping
Generic Initiator Oriinal Initiators
Large Reactiv
Mell ReWti
ity Insertion R
titj Tnsertin- R
Smalu s5eisnne
ere eismie
P-UAU.Dg-..ig
| PCA 0 6-1.2 
eactivity Insertion >$1.75 1E-5
eactivity Inser-tion $0.11]-$0.35 1 E-4
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ic PGA 0.3g-0.6g
Table 111.2. PRISM Top Event Grouping
Functional Event Original Events Failure Probability Equation
Shutdown RPS/PCS Signal Pr(SiRnaL)+Pr(RSS)
Reactor Shutdown System (rare event union)
Fuel Heat Removal Pmp Costdow n Pr(PCD)
Primary Heat Removal Shutdown Heat Removal Pr(IHTS)Pr(RVACS)
via IHTS (intersection)
Shutdown Heat Removal
via RVACS
Late Shutdown Nominal Inherent Pr(NIRF/RSS)
Reactivity Feedback
The original event trees of the PRISM PRA are in terms of safety systems. These systems can be
grouped according to the safety function they perform. Based on historical safety functions
necessary to prevent release from SFRs, four safety functions have been selected (top events in
the event tree) for the functional event trees. Table III.2 shows how the original systems are
grouped. For shutdown, the RPS/PCS Signal system is grouped with the Reactor Shutdown
System because failure of either system causes failure to shutdown.
To calculate the probability of failure for systems grouped together, the rare-event approximation
is used for the union of events. For shutdown, the sum of the failure probabilities of the
RPS/PCS Signal and Rod Insertion is used as the failure probability. For primary heat removal,
the failure probabilities of RVACS failure and Heat Removal via IHTS failure are multiplied
together. The failure probability for each event is dependent upon the initiator.
In the case of late shutdown, there is some dependence on the phenomenology of the shutdown
mechanism. This is because a lack of signal does not in itself affect the feedback mechanisms.
When rods fail to insert, the control rod drive expansion feedback becomes much less reliable.
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Failure of rod insertion dominates the failure to shut down for all initiators given in the PRISM
PRA. As such, the conditional failure probability of nominal feedback given failure to insert
rods is used.
For sequences that do not include the failure of primary heat removal, it is assumed that RVACS
is performing the function with failure of shutdown heat removal via IHTS. This assumption
groups together nominal response sequences with those sequences that have the same OK end-
state yet suffer a failure. This grouping ensures LBEs have the greater frequency of the nominal
event with more difficult phenomenology of the single failure event.
Table 111.3. and Table 111.4 show the initiator and top event groupings for the ALMR design.
Some of the major differences are the result of design change. Rod stops are included to reduce
the size of reactivity insertions. Station black out, as an initiator, is defined to include both the
loss of offsite power as well as a failure to properly go to hot standby. In PRISM this initiator
consists of just loss of offsite power.
Although mechanistic transient analyses with the assessment of uncertainties would be required
for an applicant to demonstrate compliance with the TNF framework, at the concept-
development stage generic guidelines are more helpful to the analyst who is comparing
alternatives. Denning et al developed realistic source terms, using best-estimate assumptions, for
representative generic release categories for a small metal-fueled design.
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Table 111.3. ALMR Initiator Grouping
Small Seismic PGA 0.2g-0.4g 3E-4
PGA 0.4g-0.6g 6E-5
Large Seismic PGA 1.Og-2.Og 2.4E-6
PG A Aio 1 I.'7
Table III.4. ALMR Top Event Grouping
Functional Event Original Events Failure Probability Equation
Shutdown RPS/PCS Signal [Pr(Signal)+Pr(RSS)]Pr(GEMs)
Enough Rods- Insert (rare event union of series
Enu & EN~siSucceed system ntersection withGEs
Fuel Heat Removal Pump Coastdown Pr(PCD)
Primary -Toat Demaval Chntrinum H-eat Remoral PRV* AlC1)
Late Shutdown Ultimate Shutdown Pr(USS)
System
The release categories were only developed for plant conditions in which either the primary
system or containment system is assumed to be in a failed state. Events in which both of these
barriers remain intact have extremely small radionuclide releases to the environment. In a
system with a confinement system rather than a containment system, such as the PRISM design,
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it would be necessary to examine the design basis of the system to determine its effectiveness in
retaining radionuclides under various accident conditions.
The PRISM PRA identifies twelve core damage categories, with the potential for loss of
radionuclide retention capability. For each of these core damage categories, a containment
response event tree is examined to determine the likelihoods of various release categories. If
confinement is effective, the environmental release is considered negligible. Nine release
categories are identified involving failure of confinement. With the exception of the PRISM R3
release category, all PRISM offsite doses exceed 500 rem, this gives an implied maximum
acceptable mean frequency of 1x10~7 per reactor year. The LBEs that arise from this analysis
with a frequency greater than 10-13 per reactor year aside from the nominal response to initiating
events are displayed in Table IV.
Figure 111.1 shows a graphical representation of the PRISM LBEs as well as LBEs calculated in a
similar manner for the ALMR PRA and those calculated for an LWR in the TNF. Although our
LEF calculations have been done for internal LBEs only, Figure III. 1 includes seismic initiated
LBEs. Seismic LBEs constitute all of the ALMR LBEs that lead to a non-negligible dose, and
three of the four PRISM LBEs that lead to a non-negligible dose. The final PRISM LBE leading
to a non-negligible dose is the shutdown transient followed by the failure of primary heat
removal. This transient is 600 hours in duration and bulk sodium boiling begins at 20 days
(human actions are not included in the PRISM PRA with ALMR only allowing for ultimate
shutdown).
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Figure 111.1. Plot of LBE location on the F-C Curve for several reactors (Adapted from
NUREG-1860).
This figure indicates that ALMR and PRISM would meet the F-C curve if the current PRAs are
found to be of sufficient quality. Certainly fire and other external initiators would need to be
examined as they are not included in these PRAs. As mentioned before, the seismic portion
tends to be optimistic in both PRAs with regards to fragilities of certain systems such as scram
and RVACS relative to those values found for even the most hardened systems in PWRs (e.g.,
59
containment roof failure). This could be attributed to seismic isolators at lower accelerations, but
for very rare large earthquakes, one might expect the isolators to have a considerable probability
of failure. However, the isolators are assumed to stay intact in both PRAs.
Table 111.5. LBEs Calculated from Functional PRISM PRA
Initiator Functional Events Frequency Dose
Shutdown 2. 1E-7 0
Fuel Heat Removal 2.2E-9 0
Primary Heat Removal 1.3E-8 >500 rem
Shutdown,
Ente Shutdown
1.2E-10 >500 rem
Large Reactivity Shutdown 1.5E-13
Insertion
Small Reactivity
Insertion
Shutdown
Primary Heat Removal 2.6E-12 >500 rem
Shutdown,
Late Shutdown
These frequency values were arrived at by multiplying the conditional probability of release, as
predicted by the core response and release event trees of the PRISM PRA, with the LBE
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Shutdown
Transient
2.6E-1 1 0
1.2E-12 0
frequency predicted in the functional event trees. For example, for the Large Reactivity Insertion
scenario in which shutdown has failed, the estimated event frequency is 2.6x10- 2 per reactor
year (this sequence is denoted as G3 in the PRISM PRA). This particular sequence type has a
5.7% chance of resulting in a large radioactive release. This leads to a frequency of release of
1.5x10~13. For the PRISM analysis, those LBEs that have no probability of large release turn out
to always end in non-release states, rather than in a smaller release category.
For the ALMR LBEs generic release categories from Denning et al were assigned to match the
core damage description given in the original PRA. A second set of generic trees was to be
generated to see the effect of using DRACS rather than RVACS. However, the failure
probability for all non-seismic initiators was found to be less than 10-7 per demand when the
failure and repair rates from the PRISM PRA are used. This indicates that there is no particular
advantage for either system under the TNF.
It is important to note that the small reactivity insertion with two shutdown failures does not lead
to a release. This is because the mission time is much shorter than the other transients where
these two failures lead to a high (0.41) conditional probability of release. This does not allow
time for bulk sodium boiling.
While a more detailed PRA would be necessary to show compliance with the TNF, the initial
results show that the SFR tend to have few to no small release sequences. When failure leads to a
dose, it is rare, and usually very large. This is not a lot different than is observed for LWRs
though the calculated frequencies are lower for the SFR. The dominant failure mode found in
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this review of PRAs is failure of decay heat removal during a long transient. Energetic events,
which have been the focus of multiple sodium reactor designs, are found to occur only very
rarely. The addition of a third scram system, fuel streaming channels, or other features meant to
mitigate or prevent these rare events would have no impact with regards to meeting the goals of
the TNF. Seismic events are found to be a dominant contributor to the failure of the decay heat
removal system. This is further investigated in Chapter V.
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CHAPTER IV - IMPORTANCE MEASURES
Importance measures play a significant role in risk-informed regulatory decision making. They
serve to categorize structures, systems, and components (SSCs) appearing in a plant's
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) according to their risk significance which, in turn, is one
input into the determination of the regulatory requirements, such as special treatment, that are
imposed on the SSCs.
There are several standard importance measures in use today. These are the Risk Achievement
Worth (RAW), the Risk Reduction Worth (RRW), and Fussell-Vesely (FV) (Cheok, Parry, and
Sherry 1998). RAW for an SSC is the conditional frequency of an end state (e.g., core damage
or large early release of radioactivity for a light water reactor) given that the SSC fails divided by
the baseline frequency of the end state i.e.,
RAW - Fr(end state/ SSC failure)
Fr(end state) (IV.1)
RRW for an SSC is the baseline frequency of the end state divided by the conditional frequency
of an end state given that the SSC succeeds , i.e.,
RRW- Fr(end state)
Fr(end state/ SSC success) (IV.2)
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FV is a measure of the fractional contribution of the SSC to the total frequency of the end state.
Put another way, FV is the conditional probability that, if the end state is reached, it is reached
via a failure mode that involves that SSC. FV is not a third independent importance measure. It
is related to RRW as follows:
FV=1- I
RRW (IV.3)
RAW and FV are usually used to place SSCs of nuclear power plants into several safety
categories, for example under 10 CFR 50.69. For example, those SSCs with a RAW less than
2.0 and a FV less than 0.005 are considered to be of low safety significance and the regulatory
requirements are adjusted accordingly.
IV.A. Motivation for the Development of LEF
Although the importance measures introduced above are useful for ranking the relative
importance of SSCs, they do not provide information on margin with respect to a limit or goal.
For example, suppose that a hypothetical reactor is designed with a core damage frequency
(CDF)v a factor of 100 times smaller than a presumed regulatory limit (RL) of 104 per reactor
RL
year, i.e., CDF = . If an SSC with a RAW of 2.5 were to be in the failed state, the new CDF100
of the hypothetical reactor, CDF*, would still be 40 times lower than the regulatory limit
RL_ RLCDF* = x2.5 = I. This information is not provided by RAW or any of the standard100 40
iv In this example, the end state is core damage and CDF is the quantity Fr(end state) in Equations (VI. 1) and (VI.2).
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importance measures because they deal with relative changes in the risk metric without regard to
external limits. As more regulations become risk-informed, importance measures that are related
to the regulatory limit could be useful. This becomes even more evident if one considers the
following hypothetical reactor:
- The reactor has four completely independent safety systems
- Each system is capable of preventing core damage
- Each system has a failure probability of 102
- The initiating event frequency is once per year
For this reactor, the CDF is 10- per reactor year. Each system has a RAW of 100
RAW 10 100 a RRW of infinity RRW ,= and a FV of unity
10-,, 0
1 1
FV =1- =1--= . These values would typically be considered quite high
RRW o )
suggesting that all of the systems should be treated as safety significant. However, the actual
core damage frequency of the system is 10~8 per reactor year. If the reactor were to be in a
configuration with two systems down, the reactor would still (barely) meet a regulatory limit of
10-4 per reactor year. This example demonstrates the limited use of these importance measures
for the purpose of system design within risk-informed constraints.
To address the issue of importance measures in relation to margin, Reinert and Apostolakis
developed the concept of a RAW threshold value (Reinert and Apostolakis 2006). Suppose that
the frequency of a particular end state (e.g., core damage) has a limit (threshold) Fr(end
state)threshold and that the baseline frequency of that state is Fr(end state)baseline. Then, the
RAWthreshold value is defined as:
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RAWthwehold = Fr(end state)thmshold
Fr(end state)basein, (IVA)
This value is particularly useful when a reactor is still in the design phase. An SSC with a RAW
in relation to this end state less than RAWtreshold could be a candidate for removal and the
regulatory goal would still be met.
Another motivating factor in the development of LEF was to be sure that it would be compatible
with the TNF. The standard importance measures require the end states to result from multiple
sequences to have a significant meaning. For example, consider a LBE with frequency of 3x10-3
per year and a consequence of 10 mrem. Assume that this LBE has an initiating-event frequency
of one per reactor year and contains the failure of two SSCs in series. One SSC has a failure
probability of 10-1 and the other has a failure probability of 10-2. These SSCs would have fairly
uninformative importance measures. In particular, RRW for both systems is infinity or
undefined (10-3 per year/0 per year), and FV is unity for both systems. RAW for these systems is
simply the reciprocal of the failure probability of each SSC. This would then rank reliable
systems as more important and unreliable systems as less important. It is observed from the F-C
curve that the goal is to keep an LBE with a 10 mrem dose below a frequency of 10-2 per year.
The RAWhreshold value is 3.33. Both systems would have a RAW greater than RAWthreshold.
LEF would rank both systems as being equally important. This is because either system could
have a failure probability 3.33 times the original value. This is more realistic than the other
importance measures. If the systems are one-of-three, then either system would be impacted by
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the same multiplication if it were changed to one-of-three, assuming either independence or
identical common cause failure models.
This advantage is expanded significantly when there are is a different goal for each sequence.
LEF would then be the lowest value amongst all LBEs that contain the SSC of interest.
IV.B. LEF Definition and Calculation
LEF is defined as the probability of failure for an SSC that causes the frequency of an end state,
e.g., an LBE, to be equal to the frequency limit for that end state divided by the baseline SSC
failure probability:
LEF = Pr(SSC Failure) that makes Fr(end state) equal toa limit
Pr(Baseline SSC Failure) (IV.5)
In the case where the baseline end-state frequency is already below the limit, this importance
measure is meaningful only for those SSCs with a RAW greater than RAWthreshold (see Equation
(IV.4)). For SSCs with RAW smaller than RAWthreshold, the system failure probability does not
reach the limit even when their failure probability is set equal to unity. Therefore, LEF does not
exist for these SSCs. For SSCs with RAW greater than RAWthreshold, there exists a failure
probability such that Fr(end state) = Limit. In this case, LEF is this limiting probability of failure
divided by the original probability of failure. When the baseline end-state frequency is below the
limit, all SSCs have a LEF greater than unity. Those SSCs with a large LEF have a great deal of
margin. SSCs with a LEF close to unity have little margin. When the baseline end-state
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frequency is greater than the limit, the meaning of LEF is slightly different. In a similar manner,
only those systems with a RRW greater than a certain threshold would have a useful LEF value,
i.e.,
- Fr(end state)baeline
Fr(end state)threshold (IV.6)
If an SSC has a RRW smaller than RRWthreshold, no amount of improvement to that component
alone can move the end-state frequency below the limit; therefore, LEF does not exist for these
SSCs. For SSCs with RRW greater than RRWthreshold, there exists a failure probability less than
the baseline probability that will cause the frequency of the end state to equal the limit. Those
components with LEF values closer to unity would be good candidates for improvement in
reliability for the system failure probability to meet the limit. This is because those SSCs with a
LEF closer to unity need less improvement for the system failure probability to be reduced below
the limit.
It is expected that LEF should be useful mainly at the system level because design modifications
of systems tend to give a multiplicative effect. For example, switching from a one-out-of-three
system to a one-out-of-two system for identical independent components decreases the reliability
by a factor equal to a single pump's failure probability. Since LEF is applied at the system level,
common cause failures are included as part of the baseline system failure probability.
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IV.B.1. LEF for LBEs
To calculate LEF for an SSC within the TNF is straightforward. A demonstration on how to find
LEFk for SSCk follows. Since SSCk may appear in multiple LBEs (indexed as LBE k), LEFk is
the minimum LEF over all LBEk as shown by Equation (5a), which is a modified version of
Equation (IV.5):
Ek k Pr( Failure) that such that [Fr(LBE ) = Fr(Linit for LBE] )LEFk = minkI Pr(BaselineSSCk Failure) (IV.5a)
Each LBE has an associated frequency and consequence that can be compared with the
corresponding limits of the F-C curve. It is possible that a sequence represented by an LBE
could involve different systems than the particular sequence that has the highest frequency
within the group. In order to assure compliance with the TNF, it will be necessary to rerun the
risk analysis and determine whether the modified LBE falls below the F-C curve and the
defense-in-depth requirements, if any, are met. The use of functional event trees allows the
relation of each system to an LBE to be defined algebraically. This can eliminate the need to run
the risk assessment model.
To find LEFk for each SSCk, one must first find the limiting frequency for a given LBE
consequence. For example, an LBE with a dose of 0.2 rem (when referring to LBE dose and
frequency, the 95 percentile for each is used) would have a frequency limit of 10-3 per reactor
year (Figure 11.1). Next, one finds the algebraic relationship between each LBEk and the failure
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of SSC . This relationship is defined by the model. In the case of typical event tree models, this
relationship is linear, i.e.,
Fr(LBEj) = a Pr(SSCk fails) + b (IV.7)
From Equation (IV.5a) one can then arrive at:
Fr(Limit for LBE) )= a Pr(SSC fails) LEF + b (v.8)
One can find b by evaluating the conditional frequency of LBEk with SSCk set to succeed, in
which case Pr(SSCk fails) = 0. Equation (IV.7) then yields
Fr(LBEk I SSC k succeeds) = b (IV.9)
Finally, an expression for LEFik for each LBEik containing SSCk is found:
kLEE =
Fr(Limit for LBEk dose) - Fr(LBEk /SSC ksucceeds)
Fr(LBE k) - Fr(LBEf /SSC ksucceeds) (IV.lo)
The minimum LEF calculated in this manner over all LBEi is the value assigned to SSCk (Eq.
(IV.5a). A detailed example is presented below.
70
In this example the main concerns are the internal events that lead to large release for the PRISM
design. LEF does not make sense to apply simultaneously to fragility and random internal
failures as a modification to the system design is not likely to have a simultaneous effect on these
failure modes. The limiting frequency for large releases is 10-7 per year. By using the
information in Table 111.5 with the equations for predicting top event failure probabilities, LEFk
for each SSCk can be calculated. These values are presented in Table IV.1. It is observed that
the RPS/PCS signal to scram has a large margin. Additionally, the scram system has a relatively
large amount of margin. The systems contributing to primary heat removal have little failure
probability margin. Nominal inherent reactivity feedback would have a LEF of 590 but because
the failure probability is 0.1 the multiplication can only go to 10 (indicated by 10 in parentheses).
Table IV.1. LEF Table for Systems by using LBEs
System LEF LBE
Reactor Protection System/Plant Control System Signal 240,000 Shutdown Transient,
Late shutdown
Reactor Shutdown System (scram) 590 Shutdown Transient,
Late shutdown
Pump Coastdown - N/A
Nominal Inherent Reactivity Feedback 590 (10) Shutdown Transient,
Late Shutdown
Operating Power Heat Removal - No credit taken
Shutdown Heat Removal through the Intermediate Heat 7.7 Shutdown Transient
Transfer System
Reactor Vessel Air Cooling System (RVACS) 7.7 Shutdown Transient
The purpose of this example is to demonstrate the use of LEF in determining candidates for
simplification. Although it is beyond the scope of the thesis to suggest specific design
alternatives that meet all the design requirements, a possible simplification for the signal to
scram will be considered as an example. In the PRISM design, scram success requires at least
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two-out-of-four cabinets to send a scram signal, which in turn requires two-out-of-four circuit
breakers to trip in each cabinet. This could be changed to each cabinet using two-out-of-three
breakers, or to using two-out-of-three cabinets. Further analysis would need to be done to show
that this design change meets all requirements (including defense in depth).
One may desire to include some additional margin to the regulatory limit to account for
uncertainties and possible post-license discoveries. This could be done by setting a LEF limit on
a per system basis depending on the uncertainty about the system failure. Additionally, it should
not be assumed that simplifying a system will always improve overall economics. This is
because more robust systems are likely to have higher reliability and may allow a higher capacity
factor.
The difference between the LEF values calculated here and those in Section IV.A.2 can be
attributed to the fact that LBEs with a dose limit are used in this section and a sum of sequences
that lead to energetic release is used in Section IV.B.2, i.e., different risk metrics are used for the
same frequency goal.
IV.B.2. LEFfor End States that are a Union of Sequences
Calculating LEF for an SSC where multiple sequences lead to an end state whose sum frequency
must remain below the regulatory limit is different than calculating LEF when LBEs, or single
sequences, are the limit. For example, the end-state frequency may be the core damage
frequency or the frequency of a large early release of radioactivity for a light water reactor.
First, some variables are defined:
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Fr(end state) = R
(IV.11)
Re gulatory Limit of Fr(end state) = Rthmshold (IV.12)
k kPr(SSC failure in accident sequence i) = qi (IV.13)
Using this terminology, an example is presented where an end state consists of the sum of two
sequences which each contain SSCk. This example should be sufficient to communicate the
method for calculating LEFk for an end state that is a union of sequences. For the general case,
see Appendix A.
One can take advantage of the fact that the end-state frequency is a linear combination of the
frequencies of the accident sequences leading to that end state (rare-event approximation). In
this example, SSCk is involved in two sequences leading to the end-state frequency, i.e.,
R =aiqk+a 2 qk+b
(IV. 14)
As an example, take R=10~', b=4x10-6, a,=10-2, a 2=10- , qk=3x10-4, q=3xlO1 . Rthreshold will be
defined later to demonstrate some properties of LEF. The first sequence is a more likely initiator
where the system has not been compromised. The second sequence could be a less likely
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initiator that causes the conditional failure of the system to be high such as losing multiple
support systems. It is noted that b is the sum of the frequencies of all accident sequences not
containing failure (or explicit success) of SSCk. One can then write
b = R 1qo
(IV.15)
where q=O means that both qf are set equal to zero.
Within this example, one can easily calculate RAW and RRW for SSCk.
RRW = R/b = 2.5
(IV.16)
RAW=(a +a 2 + b)/R = 1001.4
(IV. 17)
It is noted that, on the basis of these traditional importance measures, SSCk would be of high risk
significance. LEFk is now introduced:
Rthreshold =(a 1  Fk q2 +(a LEFk qk) + b
(IV.18)
This equation must be modified because the product LEFkqi may not exceed unity. This leads
to:
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Rthmshold ~(al min(1,LEF q) (a 2 min(1, LEF q2))+ b
(IV.19)
To solve for LEFk, subtract Equation (IV.14) from Equation (IV.19)
Rthreshold -R = [(a min(1, LEFk q) + (a 2 q2 - (a1 q1 + a 2 q (IV.20)
If Rthreshold is set at a value of 2x10-5, this will cause LEFk q to be less than unity for all i and
will reduce Equation (IV.20) to
R threshold 
-R +
aIqi +a 2 q 2
1= LEFk =2.66
(IV.21)
This relationship may also be written as Equation (IV.22).
R threshold -R +1=LEFk
R - R/RRWk
For more details on the derivation of this expression see Appendix A.
Finally, using Equation (IV.3) one may derive the expression
75
(IV.22)
(R thmshold /R )I =LEFk
F~k (IV.23)
If one were to set Rthreshold at 104 , this equation would not be valid. This is because LEFk qk
exceeds unity from the solution of Equation (IV.21), i.e., LEFk=17.5 and LEFkql =5.25. For this
example, the correct value of LEF will be solved for graphically using Equation (IV. 19) in
Figure IV. 1. The dashed line is Rthreshold and the solid line is the right side of the equation as
LEF increases. The solution for LEF is equal to 28.7. This is higher than the answer predicted
from equation (IV.21). A more general method to find LEFk for a sum of sequences is presented
in Appendix A.
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Figure IV.1. A graphical solution of the two-sequence example. The risk increases more
steeply until one of the LEFkqk reaches unity. Risk continues to increase from that point at
a lower rate. The solution to this example is 28.7.
In the following example, LEFs for SSCs will be determined for the frequency of an "energetic
release"" end state (i.e., CDA). This end state has been chosen because it has historically
represented a regulatory hurdle for sodium-cooled fast reactors.
Note that the frequency of energetic release here (6.4x 10-10 per reactor year) plays the role of Pr(System Failure) in
Equations (1-3 and 5, 6).
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The definition used for an energetic release end state is any end state with early or late
recriticality and a dose estimated to be greater than 500 rem'i at 1.6 kilometers from the release
point. To demonstrate this method, a postulated limit of 10-7 per reactor year is used. In this
case, though, the sum of the frequencies of all sequences rather than a single dominant sequence
is used. The sequences with frequencies below this value are screened from consideration.v" It
is noted that, although only internal events are included in this example, the dominant
contributors to energetic release in the PRISM PRA are rare large earthquakes that compromise
several SSCs, predominantly shutdown heat removal. The use of LEF for seismic fragility is not
presented here.
In this example, the functional event trees constructed for LBE selection are not used. Instead,
the PRISM PRA has been input in the code SAPHIRE. This code is then used to calculate the
RAW values with respect to energetic release. Three systems turned out to have low RAW
values (RAW << RAWthreshold). The other four systems turned out to have very high values
(RAW > 1000) (Table IV.2).
Table IV.2. RAW values for top level systems in the PRISM reactor design
System RAW
(Energetic Release)
Reactor Shutdown System (scram) 5.8E7
Reactor Vessel Air Cooling System (RVACS) 1.8E5
Shutdown Heat Removal through the Intermediate Heat 1.4E4
Transfer System
Reactor Protection System /Plant Control System Signal 1.1E3
Pump Coastdown 4.0
Nominal Inherent Reactivity Feedback 4.0
Operating Power Heat Removal 1.0
vI These are states R2A, R3, R4A, R8A, R8S, and R8U of the PRISM PRA.
2
VI This practice has also been referred to as "practical elimination."
2
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The frequency of energetic release is equal to 6.4x101 0 per reactor year. The same limit of 10~7
per reactor year is conservatively used as a limit for energetic release as a sum of sequences.
This makes RAWthreshold equal to about 150 (156 = 10-7/6.4x10-10). This value is significantly
larger than two, which is the value used to determine high-risk significant systems in current
regulations.
Using SAPHIRE's "change set" function, each of the system failure probabilities were
multiplied by a LEF as estimated by Equation (A. 13) of Appendix A. The algorithm explained
in Appendix A was then implemented manually when iteration was necessary. This was not
difficult to do for seven systems. However, if there were many systems with many failure
modes, an automated method would save time. The results are given in Table IV.3.
Table IV.3. LEF values for systems where the RAW value is greater than RAWthreshold
System LEF (Energetic Release)
Reactor Protection System /Plant Control System Signal 2.5E8
Reactor Shutdown System (scram) 460
Shutdown Heat Removal through Intermediate Heat 240
Transfer System
Reactor Vessel Air Cooling System (RVACS) 250
Of particular note is the signal to scram (Reactor Protection System/Plant Control System
Signal). It is observed that the RAW value is very high indicating high importance according to
10 CFR 50.69. However, LEF is also high, indicating room for simplification while still meeting
the safety goals. The scram signal failure probability as given is 1.4x 10 per demand, which is
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very low compared to typical PWR numbers (USNRC 1994). Even if the probability is set to
something more in line with typical PWR reliability, such as 1.4x 10~ , LEF would still be 250.
As seen in Section IV.B. 1, the scram system itself has substantial margin with a LEF of 38. Both
the RVACS and Intermediate Heat Transfer System have relatively low LEF values and due to
their passive and simple nature would not be good candidates for simplification regardless of the
LEF value. For these systems, both the RAW value and the LEF value indicate high importance.
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CHAPTER V - SEISMICALLY INITIATED LICENSING BASIS EVENTS
Seismic requirements for nuclear power plants within the United States have historically been
the result of a negotiation between the applicant and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC). The NRC and the applicant rely on engineering judgment and knowledge of seismic
activity at the site to determine both the Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) and the Safe
Shutdown Earthquake (SSE).
The OBE according to 1 OCFR50 Appendix S is "the vibratory ground motion for which those
features of the nuclear power plant necessary for continued operation without undue risk to the
health and safety of the public will remain functional. The operating basis earthquake ground
motion is only associated with plant shutdown and inspection unless specifically selected by the
applicant as a design input" (US Code of Federal Regulations, 2007. Title 10, Part 50, Appendix
S to Part 50).
The SSE is "the vibratory ground motion for which certain structures, systems, and components
must be designed to remain functional." The SSE is to be at least 0.1 g peak ground acceleration
(PGA) and the OBE is typically one third of the SSE acceleration. Typical PGA values of SSEs
for plants east of the Rocky Mountains range from 0.1 g to 0.25g and the PGA values for plants
west of the Rocky Mountains range from 0.25g to 0.75g. For comparison, the Niigataken
Chuetsu-Oki earthquake was measured at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa site in Japan to have a PGA
between 0.69g-0.83g.
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In applying the TNF to SFRs, it was observed that seismically induced failures presented the
greatest challenge to the ALMR and PRISM designs. This is because SFRs are susceptible to
reactivity insertions, sloshing, and other seismically induced failure modes that LWRs are not.
The main failure mode is failure of the decay heat removal system due to a seismic initiator that
also causes a reactivity insertion. Both of these designs attempt rely on seismic isolators to help
meet the TNF goal. Although isolators should be useful in most scenarios, in very rare large
earthquakes, the isolators could fail leading to plant damage states that are difficult to analyze
and would likely lead to a large release. The hazard curves used in both PRAs are fairly low, but
are intended to cover 90% of all U.S. reactor sites. This is shown later by comparing the
initiators used in the PRAs to the hazard curve from the Clinton site which is of low to moderate
seismicity (USNRC 2006).
As seen in Figure 11.1, the lowest frequency considered is 10-7 per reactor year. This means that
when selecting seismic LBEs, they should sufficiently cover the range from the OBE frequency
down to the cutoff. This means that one must consider seismic hazards all the way down to a
mean frequency of 10-7. It is in this very rare region where it is difficult to quantify risk. Even if
some assumptions are made that all the risk to be quantified, the problem becomes demonstrating
that the goal is met.
When dealing with very rare earthquakes, getting quantitative information from experts or
available data is difficult. A question arises as to what the maximum possible peak ground
acceleration might be. In a study done to examine rare earthquakes for the Yucca Mountain3
repository, the model used to determine the largest possible earthquake based on mechanistic
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analysis finds that there is no maximum for peak ground acceleration (Andrew, Hanks, Whitney
2007):
"We will not report peak ground acceleration (PGA). The strength of the material does not
limit peak acceleration. In contrast to a lumped mass, a waveform in a continuum can have a
step change in velocity (a delta function in acceleration) with finite stress. The physical
principles we are applying do not impose a limit on the PGA."
The authors do report a maximum possible peak ground velocity as well as several maximum
spectral velocities. It has also been noted by Bommer et al that, although it would be valuable to
define an upper limit on PGA, it is difficult to defend any such proposed limit in the light of our
relatively short observation period and the failure of previous models to accurately predict a limit
(Bommer et al 2004). Given that there is no strong evidence for a physical limit to peak ground
acceleration, probabilistic methods that have no maximum cutoff should be used.
A review of the available data reveals that most seismic hazard curves do not extend to an annual
probability of exceedance less than 10~6 per year (Figure V.1) and, more notably, none of the
Eastern United States (EUS) sites have a hazard curve that goes beyond lg PGA.
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Figure V.1. Multiple seismic hazard curves for a variety of nuclear sites in the US (REI
2001).
Compared with current methods, demanding a radioactivity release of less than 500 rem as
the 9 5th percentile of consequences for an earthquake with a return period of ten million years is
quite stringent. For example, the SSE at Diablo Canyon, a site with a high seismic hazard, is
0.75g and the annual probability of exceedance is 2.5x10-4. For a California Site, given the
hazard curve in Figure V.1, the magnitude of an earthquake with a frequency of exceedance of
10-7 could be higher than 5g.
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In this exercise, the Clinton site seismic hazard curves are used. This is due to the fact that the
hazard curves of this site are representative of an EUS site with moderate seismicity.
Additionally, a performance-based"" metric is used in the early site permit (ESP) (U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission 2006). This method led to the Clinton ESP containing detailed
expressions for the seismic hazard and plant fragility curves. These expressions allow numerical
calculations to be performed that illustrate the implications of seismic risk analysis within the
TNF and that illustrate the benefits of seismic isolation.
If one is to use the TNF to choose seismic LBEs, this choice could take place in a few different
ways. This is because, within the TNF, what constitutes a sequence or initiator is left for the
applicant to decide. The end state of each sequence is to be release. The mean and 9 5 th
percentile dose of this release at a certain distance from the reactor is the consequence that must
meet the F-C curve. A simplified event tree model will be used to demonstrate all the methods
explored in this paper. The model consists of the initiating seismic event, a plant failure event,
and a containment failure event (Figure V.2). Given plant failure, there is core damage. Given
containment failure and plant failure, there is a large release (9 5 th percentile dose > 500 rem).
In the performance-based approach, the seismic design parameters are chosen so that the total contribution from
seismic accident sequences satisfies a goal. For example, in the Clinton ESP, the stated performance goal is 10-5 per
reactor year for the core damage frequency due to seismic initiated sequences.
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CD
LR
Figure V.2. A simple event tree for seismic risk assessment. End states are OK, core
damage, and large release.
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Figure V.3. Clinton site seismic hazard curves (US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2006).
Before discussing examples of each method, the actual hazard curves (Figure V.3) and fragility
curves from the Clinton ESP are introduced, as well as the seismic hazard function and fragility
function used within the examples. The mathematical expression of the conservatively
extrapolated hazard curves is:
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H(a) = C aK (V.1)
where H(a) is the annual probability of exceeding acceleration a. C and K are constants
determined using two points on the curve. In this case, the points used were H(a)=l04 and 10~5.
This results in a 1 Hz spectral acceleration hazard curve with C=2.7x10-6 and K=-2.4. This
extrapolates conservatively to 3.9g at an annual exceedance probability of 107 . Similarly,
extrapolation of the 10 Hz spectral acceleration hazard curve results in 4.5g with an annual
exceedance probability of 10-7. This 10 Hz spectral acceleration hazard curve will be used to
demonstrate the methodology. In addition to this power law extrapolation, a less conservative
Weibull distribution is also used that fits the entirety of the hazard curve well. A complete set of
data is not available so a goodness of fit test has not been performed. The hazard curve of this
particular distribution is given in equation (V.2)
H(a) = 0.225e-(360a0.3 9  (V.2)
This is a complementary cumulative Weibull distribution with a shape factor of 0.39 and a scale
factor of 360. The front coefficient of 0.225 is necessary as the integration of exceedance
frequency does not necessarily integrate to unity. This fit to the 10 Hz spectral acceleration
hazard curve results in about 2.6g with an annual exceedance probability of 10~7. This is
significantly smaller, but it is still a very large acceleration compared with typical SSEs. The
two curves are shown in Figure V.4.
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Figure V.4. The power law (linear in log-log space) and Weibull distribution fit hazard curves,
The TNF demands that all seismic events down to 10~7 per year be considered. With the high
accelerations that are predicted, designing structures that would reduce the large release sequence
frequency below 10-Ope year is prohibitive.
These results indicate that the TNF, as currently formulated, is impractical. The problem appears
to be that there is no limit on initiating event frequency. For example, when one considers
earthquakes with frequencies slightly above 10-7 per year the accelerations are unknown, but
would certainly be very large. Demonstrating that a design meets the F-C curve would be nearly
impossible.
To further elaborate on this point, consider a numerical example using the event tree described
above. To calculate sequence frequencies, seismic fragilities for the plant failure and
containment failure events are needed. In this model, only structural failure of the containment
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is considered, i.e., bypass is not included. Fragilities usually take the form of a lognormal
distribution. The cumulative distribution function is defined as:
F(a; p p) = ID (" (V.3)
where CD is the cumulative distribution of the normal function, u=ln(median) and p=0.4 as in the
Clinton ESP. For ALMR and PRISM the dominant failure mode for a seismic initiator is failure
of decay heat removal. The conditional failure probability for this function is optimistic in both
PRAs. It can be assumed that the mean fragility of the decay heat removal system (the most
robust system) from the EBR-II PRA of 1.5g is the mean plant fragility. Using the property that
the mean of a lognormal distribution is equal to exp(pu+ pi2), p is found to be equal to 0.2 4 g.
Alternatively, pt can be determined for a generic plant using the high confidence of low
probability of failure (HCLPF) value which is commonly taken as the 1% confidence level.
Using the properties of the lognormal distribution:
= lnHCLPF + 2.326 f (V4)
A typical LWR has a HCLPF around 0.5g. This also gives p=0.24g and fully defines our plant
fragility curve. This curve should be approximately valid for both an LWR and an SFR without
isolation (as the EBR-II does not feature isolation). It is noted that, when doing the numerical
calculations in equations (V.2) and (V.4), a logarithm is taken of a value with the units of g. For
example, in equation (V.4) the ln(HCLPF) is equal to ln(0.5).
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For the containment failure probability, both a confinement building (for advanced designs that
may not need hardened containment) and a typical PWR containment are analyzed. The
confinement building will use the same fragility curve as the auxiliary building for a typical
PWR with a median fragility of 0.73g (p=-0.31g) and p3=0.56. For the hardened containment a
median of 1.8g (p=0.59g) and pl=0.52 are used (Kaplan, Perla, and Bley 1983).
Initiating event frequencies and magnitudes must also be selected. The method that would be
the most consistent with the TNF is to choose several ranges on a seismic hazard curve and, then,
define initiating events based on that seismic hazard. The initiating events should appropriately
cover all events down to a mean frequency of 107 per year. The most conservative way to
define the initiating events would be to take the highest exceedance frequency of the range to be
covered and the highest acceleration of the range to be covered and use these values as the
initiating event that must be satisfied. For example, one could choose to take the ranges OBE
(0.1 g)-0.5g, 0.5g- I g, 1 g-2g, and 2g-4g. There would then be four initiating events. These events
would have the frequency of the hazard at the beginning of the range, and the acceleration of the
end of the range. This is commensurate with taking the highest frequency in the bin and the
most limiting consequences in the bin.
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Figure V.4 Schematic of LBE initiator selection using equation (V.1).
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FigureV.6. Schematic of LBE initiator selection using equation (V.I1)
Figure V.5 shows this graphically for the three larger initiators using the extrapolated hazard
curve from the Clinton site for 10 Hz. It is noted that this extrapolation is conservative outside
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of the range of 10-4 and 10~5 due to the concavity of the seismic hazard curve. Figure V.5. shows
this same selection for the Weibull distribution fit to the hazard curve. This is a better estimate
of the actual hazard especially at higher frequencies. It is noted that the first two initiators are
more or less the same. This is because the extrapolated hazard curve is accurate between 10-4
and 10- per year. The final initiator covering the range from 2g to the end of the hazard curve is
much smaller for the Weibull distribution (2.6g) than for the power law extrapolation (4g).
This is the method used in both the ALMR and PRISM PRAs (Hackford 1986; El-Sheikh 1994).
However, the frequency of the initiators and the fragility of structures, systems, and components
in these PRAs seem optimistic. For example, the ALMR PRA estimates the annual probability
of exceedance of 2g as 1.3x10-7. In comparison to the extrapolated hazard curve, this is an order
of magnitude less frequent. In comparison to the Weibull distribution, this is about one fourth as
frequent. The seismicity of the hypothetical site proposed in the PRA is supposed to cover 90%
of all US sites. An example of optimistic seismic fragility in the ALMR PRA is that RVACs fails
with a probability of 10-5 given an initiating seismic event with a PGA of 2g. This indicates that
the robustness of the building is significantly higher than a typical containment structure for a
PWR.
With these optimistic estimates of seismic hazard, the ALMR and PRISM do meet the F-C curve
of the TNF as seen in the LBE map of Figure 111.1. The most frequent seismically induced
sequence resulting in a large release is 2.2x10-8 per year in the PRISM PRA and 10-13 per year in
the ALMR PRA (it is noted here that the ALMR PRA is much more optimistic about decay heat
removal fragility than the PRISM PRA).
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If the extrapolated hazard curve from the Clinton site is used with the conservative method for
initiator selection described above, the most stringent initiator is found to have a frequency of
1.3x 106 and an acceleration of 4g. This is represented by the star furthest right on figure V.4.
This initiating event frequency is then multiplied by the failure probability of the plant and the
probability of failure of the containment function. This can then be determined for any given
seismic initiator with a PGA of a using equation (V.5). This equation arises from the event tree
model shown in figure V.2.
Large Release Freq.= Initiating Freq. (a) * Fpiant(a) * Fcontainment(a) (V.5)
Where Fplant and Fcontainment are the conditional failure probabilities determined for the plant and
containment function calculated using equation (V.3). When the conditional probability of large
release for a given a is mentioned, it refers to the product of Fpant and Fcontainment. Using the
stringent initiator described above and a hardened containment as inputs into equation (V.5)
gives a point estimate for large release of 1.2x 10-6 per year. This means the conditional
probability of a large release given a 4g acceleration is 0.94 with hardened containment. This
shows that these large earthquakes will almost certainly fail all engineering measures
implemented. When the same initiator is used as an input with confinement instead of
containment, the conditional failure probability is nearly unity.
These conditional probabilities of large release assume independence between plant failure and
containment failure. Only seismically induced failure of the containment is considered without
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consideration of internal pressure loads. Clearly, with this point estimate, the 9 5th percentile
estimate will surely be above the F-C curve of the TNF. This causes us to explore other methods
for choosing the seismic initiators, or to seek an alternative goal for seismically initiated events
than for internal events.
Another, perhaps more appropriate, method that would use a similar technique would be to cover
a variety of ranges by selecting frequency ranges. For example, one could take 10- per year to
10- per year for "frequent" earthquakes, 10-3 per year to 10-5 per year for "infrequent"
earthquakes, and 10~5 per year to 104 per year for "rare" earthquakes. Doing this does not really
change the method, but would change the frequency and magnitude of the seismic initiators used
as input to the event tree. This change is fairly insignificant and would not change the results of
the analysis presented above.
One could use a similar method to the one described in figures V.4 and V.5, but instead of
choosing points above the hazard curve to cover sections of the curve, one would choose points
on the curve. That is, one would choose an initiator with a certain PGA and use the exceedance
frequency as the initiating frequency. This is certainly less conservative than the other method
proposed but would give a better estimation of the actual core damage and large release
frequencies. Unfortunately, this change in method does not make a typical reactor any more
likely to meet the standard. Even if the calculated large release frequency is just above 10-, this
method would not succeed in meeting the goal set forth by the F-C curve.
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Seismic initiator selection is shown in Table V.1 using four ranges that each covers an order of
magnitude. The higher frequency would be used in the conservative method, and the lower
frequency would be used if the initiator frequencies are chosen from the curve. We see that the
extrapolated hazard curve has significantly larger initiators than the Weibull fit hazard curve for
events rarer than 105 per year.
Table 1. Seismic LBE Initiators. The range covered by the initiator is in the leftmost
column. The high number is the initiating event frequency if the conservative method is
used. The low number is initiating event frequency if the hazard curve itself is used.
Initiator Frequency Range Initiator Peak Ground Initiator Peak Ground
Acceleration: Acceleration:
Power Law Extrapolation Weibull Distribution Fit
10-3 10~4 per year 0.5g 0.5g
10-4 - 10- per year 1.og 1.og
10-" - 10- per year 2.2g 1.7g
10-6 - 10-' per year 4.5g 2.6g
Once again, using a numerical example, an acceleration of 4.2g is selected as the initiating
seismic event and the associated exceedance frequency on the extrapolated Clinton site hazard
curve, and thus the initiating frequency used in the event tree, is 1.3x10-7 per year. This is used
as the input value in equation (V.5). The conditional probability of large release given a
hardened containment for this initiator is 0.96. The frequency of the large release for this
seismic LBE is then 1.2x10-7. It is observed that this method calculates a frequency
approximately an order of magnitude lower than the conservative method where initiators are
chosen from above the hazard curve. However, the frequency is still above 10-7 per year and
would thus be included as an LBE and the TNF goal would not be met.
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One would also like to know the impact of a smaller, higher frequency earthquake at 2g.
Inputting this value into equation (V.5) gives a conditional probability of large release is 0.51
with traditional containment and 0.84 with a confinement building. This in combination with the
annual probability of exceedance for a 2g earthquake of 1.3x10~6 retrieved from the Clinton site
hazard curve results in a frequency of large release of 6.5x10-7 per year with containment and
1.1 x 10-6 per year with confinement. It is noted again that these values will not meet the TNF
goals. This means that earthquakes may have a substantial impact under the TNF well before the
10~7 cutoff.
The F-C curve is not going to be met by typical reactor designs for very large, rare earthquakes.
Trying to design a reactor to meet this standard would be expensive and burdensome.
Alternatively, the design would have to have sufficiently small fuel inventory such that a 500
rem release is not possible no matter the damage. This leads us to explore other options with
regards to what the goal should be or how rare an external initiating event one should consider
when building a plant.
V.A. Earthquake frequency limit
If one limits the external initiator frequency to something less stringent than 10-7, such as 10-,
one arrives at a different, smaller earthquake as the limiting factor in the analysis. If one uses the
proposed limit of 10- per year as the initiating frequency with the Clinton site hazard curve one
finds the corresponding acceleration to be 1.0g. Using this value in equation (V.5) yields a
conditional probability of large release of 3.5x10 2 for a typical reactor with containment and
0.19 for a reactor with a confinement building around the nuclear island. Both of these designs
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would still not meet the F-C curve because the large release frequency is above the limit at
3.5x10-7 and 1.9x10-6 per year respectively (just barely in the case of the reactor with
containment). This size of quake is much larger than those typically considered for SSEs, but is
significantly smaller than quakes one or two orders of magnitude rarer.
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Figure V.6. Peak Ground Acceleration vs. Frequency using the power law extrapolation.
The dotted horizontal line highlights the 10~7 per year cutoff of the TNF. The dash-dot line
shows a plot of equation (V.5) using the extrapolated seismic hazard curve for a plant with
confinement. The dashed line shows a plot of equation (V.5) for a plant with a containment
building. The thin double line shows the frequency cutoff that would allow a plant with
containment to be licensed.
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Figure V.7. Peak Ground Acceleration vs. Frequency using the Weibull fit. The dotted
horizontal line highlights the 10 7 per year cutoff of the TNF. The dash-dot line shows a
plot of equation (V.5) using the extrapolated seismic hazard curve for a plant with
confinement. The dashed line shows a plot of equation (V.5) for a plant with a containment
building. The thin double line shows the frequency cutoff that would allow a plant with
containment to be licensed.
Figures V.6 and V.7 show the frequency of the initiating event from the extrapolated hazard curve
and the Weibull fit (respectively) as well as the frequency of release for the two different cases
considered. From the graph it is found that an initiating event frequency cutoff of 3x10~5 per
year would allow the example design with containment to be licensed. This is true for either
method of representing the hazard curve as this is the region where both the extrapolated hazard
and the Weibull fit best match the actual hazard curve. This is illustrated using a double thin line
that shows where the frequency of large release is below the 10-7 cutoff and the associated
frequency from the hazard curve. Likewise, a frequency cutoff of 1.5x10-4 per year would allow
the design without containment to be licensed. Compare these frequencies to SSEs which tend to
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have a frequency around 10-4 per year. With proper design features, meeting the TNF goals with
an initiating event cutoff at 10- per year may be possible. This is in contrast a 4g earthquake as
the conditional probability of failure for even robust systems is nearly unity and as such adding
another system would only slightly reduce the frequency of large release.
A design option that is often explored to reduce seismic risk is seismic isolation. This design
feature is used in the PRISM and ALMR design and has a cited maximum capacity of 1.2g
according to the PRISM PRA (Hackford 1986). Although a more robust and complete analysis is
necessary to show the effect of seismic isolators on plant fragility, a numerical example has been
performed. The cited maximum capacity for the isolator has been assigned to the 1 0 th, median,
and 9 0 th percentile of lognormal fragility curves with /3=0.5 and p=0.3. In this analysis, it is
assumed that isolator failure is necessary for core damage. This adds a term to equation (V.5) for
the probability of isolation failure leading to equation (V.6).
Large Release Freq. =
Initiating Freq. (a) * Fpiant(a) * Fcontainment(a) * Fisolation(a) (V.6)
This optimistic assumption may not be a good one for all reactor types. In particular, reactivity
insertion due to vertical movement poses a threat to fast reactors. The frequency of large release
shown in Figures V.8-V.15 has been calculated by multiplying the conditional failure probability
of the plant, isolation, and containment (or confinement) building with the initiating frequency
for the given acceleration using equation (V.6). The solid line in all of the figures is the
extrapolated hazard curve from the Clinton site using either equation (V.1) or equation (V.2). All
failures were assumed to be independent. This is also an optimistic assumption; failure of
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seismic isolation may lead to failure of the isolated structure. This effect would mean that, if an
isolator is less robust than the building it is intended to isolate, it would be a disadvantage to
implement.
Figure V.8. The frequency of large release for a typical reactor with isolation and a
hardened containment dome as calculated in equation (V.6). Each curve represents a
different calculation of the isolation system fragility curve. The fragility for the isolation is
defined by assigning 1.2g to the percentile failure shown in the legend and /=0.5.
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Figure V.9. The frequency of large release for a typical reactor with isolation and a
hardened containment dome as calculated in equation (V.6). Each curve represents a
different calculation of the isolation system fragility curve. The fragility for the isolation is
defined by assigning 1.2g to the percentile failure shown in the legend and fl=0.3.
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Figure V.10. The frequency of large release for a typical reactor with isolation and a
confinement building as calculated in equation (V.6). Each curve represents a different
calculation of the isolation system fragility curve. The fragility for the isolation is defined
by assigning 1.2g to the percentile failure shown in the legend and fp=0.5.
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Figure V.11. The frequency of large release for a typical reactor with isolation and a
confinement building as calculated in equation (V.6). Each curve represents a different
calculation of the isolation system fragility curve. The fragility for the isolation is defined
by assigning 1.2g to the percentile failure shown in the legend and f=0.3.
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Figure V.12. The frequency of large release for a typical reactor with isolation and a
containment building as calculated in equation (V.6). Each curve represents a different
calculation of the isolation system fragility curve. The fragility for the isolation is defined
by assigning 1.2g to the percentile failure shown in the legend and /=0.5. The Weibull fit of
the hazard curve is used.
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Figure V.13. The frequency of large release for a typical reactor with isolation and a
containment building as calculated in equation (V.6). Each curve represents a different
calculation of the isolation system fragility curve. The fragility for the isolation is defined
by assigning 1.2g to the percentile failure shown in the legend and /=0.3. The Weibull fit of
the hazard curve is used.
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Figure V.14. The frequency of large release for a typical reactor with isolation and a
confinement building as calculated in equation (V.6). Each curve represents a different
calculation of the isolation system fragility curve. The fragility for the isolation is defined
by assigning 1.2g to the percentile failure shown in the legend and /=0.5. The Weibull fit of
the hazard curve is used.
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Figure V.15. The frequency of large release for a typical reactor with isolation and a
confinement building as calculated in equation (V.6). Each curve represents a different
calculation of the isolation system fragility curve. The fragility for the isolation is defined
by assigning 1.2g to the percentile failure shown in the legend and fl=0.3. The Weibull fit of
the hazard curve is used.
As one can see from the figures, seismic isolation would be unlikely to solve issues regarding
earthquakes of 10-6 per year and rarer. The only scenario that nearly meets the goal is using the
Weibull fit hazard curve, containment, and isolation failure of 1.2g as the 1 0 th percentile. This is
the most optimistic scenario and as mentioned before is calculated using optimistic assumptions
of independent failure of the plant, containment and isolation. It is observed that all of the curves
representing the large release frequency pinch together with the hazard curve; usually, this is well
before the 10~7per year cutoff. This shows that there is a near unity conditional failure
probability given these rare seismic initiating events. Even with containment and the optimistic
estimation of 1.2g as the 10th percentile failure probability, our test case does not meet the goal.
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There is certainly a benefit to using isolation and that this benefit increases with decreasing
frequency of the seismic initiator. This may make implementing a 10~5 per year initiating event
cutoff more manageable. Figures V.10, V.11, V.14, and V.15 show that with a robust enough
isolation system, a confinement building may be enough to meet the TNF goal, if the external
initiating event frequency is limited to 10-5 per year. It is also noted that this cutoff may allow
for a tradeoff analysis to be done between a hardened containment dome and confinement with
isolation for some reactor designs.
This type of initiating event cutoff frequency is not consistent with the TNF which specifically
states that all external initiators should be considered down to the cutoff. However, limiting the
frequency of external initiators gives a little more realism to meeting the goals. When one starts
to consider external initiators that occur with a frequency of 10~7 per year, one has stopped
considering what could be a reasonable threat to safety and has started considering truly
incredible events that pose a serious threat to all supporting systems and buildings. By
comparison, an internal initiator with a frequency of 10-7 per year may simply constitute the
failure of two systems, or failure of a single highly reliable passive system. Inclusion of these
within the licensing basis makes sense, because, if the probability of failure has been
miscalculated, such an event may be significantly more likely than estimated. Additionally, one
may design a feature to prevent damage given this rare internal event. Rare seismic events
cannot really be designed against for most traditional reactors.
It is worth noting that an earlier proposal by the NRC staff to risk-inform the regulations
designated initiating events with frequencies less than 10-5 per year as being "rare." For such
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events, the conditional probabilities of core damage and containment failure are allowed to be as
high as unity. In this proposal, there was no consideration for the dose of each sequence (US
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2000).
Additionally, it is stated in WASH-1270 that an "aiming point" of one in a thousand years for the
fleet should be the edge of the design envelope. In this document, a fleet of one thousand plants
is considered resulting in a proposed design envelope cutoff of 10-6 per reactor year. WASH-
1270 is careful to note that this is not meant as a hard limit to be demonstrated for a given plant
but a design objective (US Atomic Energy Commission 1973).
The NRC staff has been working on risk-informing the large loss-of-coolant-accident (LLOCA)
rule. The idea is to propose a "transition break size" (TBS) such that pipe breaks greater than the
TBS would be treated as beyond-design-basis events. In this context, the Commission stated: "a
frequency of I occurrence in 100,000 reactor years is an appropriate mean value for the LOCA
frequency guideline for selecting the maximum design-basis LOCA since it is complemented by
the requirement that appropriate mitigation capabilities, including effective severe accident
mitigation strategies, must be retained for the beyond design-basis LOCA category." (US
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2004; US Code of Federal Regulations 2004). This statement
indicates that the Commission considers the frequency of 10-5 per reactor year as an appropriate
lower bound for the initiating events that should be included in the design basis. The NRC has
also assessed the impact of seismic events on the TBS rulemaking and has found that the
contribution to large-break LOCAs from earthquakes with an annual exceedance probability of
10~5 per year to be negligible and that 10-6 per year earthquakes are major contributors to LOCA
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due to support failure for large piping (US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2008). They
concluded that seismic hazard does not appear to greatly affect the failure frequency of pipes
larger than the proposed TBS.
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CHAPTER VI - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Sodium cooled fast reactors (SFRs) are considered as a novel example to exercise the
Technology Neutral Framework (TNF) proposed in NUREG-1860. One reason for considering
SFRs is that they have historically had a licensing problem due to postulated core disruptive
accidents (CDAs). The TNF provides a method to argue that they should not be designed against
CDAs to the detriment of reactor operations. In implementing the TNF with existing SFR PRAs,
several key conclusions have been reached regarding future implementation:
* The review of the ALMR and PRISM PRAs revealed that several of the failure
probabilities are quite optimistic, i.e., they are too low.
" As completed, the ALMR and PRISM PRAs show these designs comply with the TNF
for internal events (PWRs do not comply). Even if PWR numbers are used for scram and
pump seizure, this result is unchanged.
" A more detailed and realistic PRA that includes fire (and other) initiators is necessary
before it is attempted to satisfy the TNF.
" A prescriptive approach to LBE construction such as functional event trees is a useful
development to prevent applicants from arbitrarily splitting sequences to arrive at
apparently lower frequencies.
" Although core disruptive accidents are found to be well below the TNF cutoff, there is
still a concern that this accident could be used as the deterministic LBE, thus negating the
benefit of the very low frequencies associated with these accidents.
* Traditional risk metrics are not compatible with LBEs.
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e Limit exceedance factor is a new measure designed to be used with the TNF or other
quantitative risk metrics and reveals that some systems thought to be important using
other importance measures may have a significant amount of margin.
e Typical designs of SFRs cannot meet the TNF due to the requirement of including
sequences initiated by very rare earthquakes. This conclusion also holds for PWRs.
" Seismologists do not quantify seismic risk to very low frequencies. Extrapolation reveals
that these rare accelerations seismic events may have huge accelerations.
" It is recommended that a frequency cutoff be established for external events, as these
events may pose a significant threat to all systems and may not be practical to design
against.
Functional event trees are developed as a tool to allow different designs to be compared on an
equal basis. Functional event trees are useful within the TNF as a method for the selection of
Licensing Basis Events (LBEs) which take the place of traditional Design Basis Accidents. The
ALMR and PRISM designs are considered, and for internal events only both are found meet the
goals of the TNF that LWRs typically would not. A more thorough analysis would be needed to
prove that this is the case.
Considering these goals have been met, a method for improving economics is proposed where
systems of low risk-importance are identified as candidates for removal, simplification, or
removal from safety grade. Standard importance measures are not directly useful in the TNF for
this task. An importance measure that can be used directly with LBEs, Limit Exceedance Factor
(LEF), is introduced that measures the margin in system failure probability. Some systems that
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appear to be of high risk-importance with standard importance measures are revealed to have
large margins in their failure probability.
Seismic events are found to dominate risk for the designs considered. The seismic analysis done
for these designs is found to be optimistic in comparison to actual seismic hazard and component
fragilities. Using the seismic hazard and fragilities from a typical reactor, and from
Experimental Breeder Reactor-II, a method for analyzing seismic events in parallel to the method
used for internal events is examined. The result of this analysis is that the goals of the TNF
cannot be met by typical SFRs or PWRs for the seismically initiated LBEs. The effect of seismic
isolation to reduce LBEs that result in large release is analyzed and found to be insufficient to
reach the TNF goal. This is because very rare seismic events must be considered that cause the
failure probability of engineered systems to be nearly unity. Limiting the initiating seismic event
frequency to be considered (e.g. 10-5) is proposed as a solution that is commensurate with current
practices.
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APPENDIX A - GENERAL SOLUTION TO LEF FOR AN END STATE THAT IS THE
SUM OF SEQUENCES
This is a general case extending from the two sequence case presented in Section IV.B. First,
some variable definitions:
Fr(end state) = R
(A.1)
Re gulatory Limit of Fr(end state) = R threshold (A.2)
Pr(SSC k failure in accident sequence i) = qj (A.3)
For any SSCk, the end-state frequency is a linear function of that SSC's failure probability, i.e.,
R = ( )+b
(A.4)
where the sum is over all accident sequences i containing SSCk. It is important to note that qk
may be different in each accident sequence depending on the failure of other components or the
initiating event. It is also noted that b is the sum of the frequencies of all accident sequences not
containing failure (or explicit success) of SSCk. One can then write
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i
b = R O
(A.5)
where q=O means that all qf are set equal to zero. LEF is now introduced:
R threshold i LEFk
(A.6)
This equation must be modified because LEFkqf in any accident sequence may not exceed
unity. We, therefore, write
Rthreshold (ai min(1, LEFk q)) +b
kTo solve for LEF , subtract equation (A.4) from equation (A.7)
R threshold R = Z (a min(1, LEFk q k
For those SSCs where LEF q is always less than unity this simplifies further to
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(A.7)
(A.8)
Rthreshold -R+=LEFk
(ai qj) (A.9)
The value of the sum in the denominator must be found. This is easily done from (A.4) and
(A.5)
Z(a q,)= R-RIq=O
Using Equation (IV.2), this is equivalent to
(ai q) = R - R/RRWk
Substituting Equation (A. 11) into Equation (A.9), one will arrive at
R threshold -R +1=LEFk
R - R/RRWk
(A.10)
(A.11)
(A.12)
Finally, using Equation (IV.3), the following expression gives LEF in terms of FV, R, and
Rthreshold-
(RthresholIR) 1 +1 = LEFk
FVk (A.13)
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i
For those SSCs where one LEF qj reaches unity before the risk limit has been
exceeded, Equation (A.13) is not valid. Because there may be many failure modes, finding a
closed form solution to Equation (A.8) is a difficult task. A method to find the solution with a
small number of model evaluations is preferred. From the form of Equation (A.8), it is observed
that R(qk) is a piecewise linear function where each piece has a lower slope than the last.
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In Figure 3, the SSC has three failure modes. The first failure mode may be due to an
earthquake initiator. The second might be for a sequence with an initiating event that
compromises function of the system. The final failure mode may be the failure probability when
the SSC is not compromised.
The shaded region is where Equation (A.13) is a valid solution to find the true LEFk
value. The limit shown is above where the first failure mode has reached unity. The estimate of
LEF from Equation (A.13), LEFk, will always be an underestimate when this is the case.
Finding the true LEFk is a typical root finding problem.
The piecewise linear nature of the function makes the secant method an ideal way to find
the true LEF . Using the estimate from Equation (A.13), the new risk, R1 is found. The first
iteration LEF kis:
Rthreshold -R(LEF -1)= LEFk1
R -R 
-1(A.14)
The subsequent iterations are slightly different.
LEFk Rthreshold Rn (LEFi - LEF2 L
R -R"~I 1)E (A.15)
This method in combination with software such as SAPHIRE allows a user to quickly find the
exact LEFk of each SSCk.
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APPENDIX B - FUNCTIONAL EVENT TREES
ALMR FUNCTIONAL TREES
IN THE ORDER OF
Large Seismic
Medium Seismic
Small Seismic
Forced Shutdown
Local Blockage (Adapted from PRISM)
Loss of Flow
Large Reactivity Insertion
Medium Reactivity Insertion
Small Reactivity Insertion
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EQLARGE SCRAMILO FUELHR PRIMARYHRILQ LATESCRAM Prob
1.30E-07 1.00E+00 1.30E -06 1 .0OE-05 1.00E-01
0.00EE+00
0.00EE+00
1.30E -06
0.00EE+00
1.30E-071
1.30E-07
1.30E -07
1.00E+00
1.30E -07
1.30E-06
1.69E-13
0.OOE+00
0.00E+00 0.OOE+00
0.OOE+00 1.OOE-05
0.00E+00 O.00E+00
0.00E+00 0.00E+00
1.00E-05
0.00E+00 0.00E+00
9.00E-01
1.1 7E-07
1.30E-07 1.O0E-01
1.30E-08
9.00E-01
1.00E-05 1.17E-12
1.30E-12 1.O0E-01
1.30E-13
9.00E-01
1.52E-13
1.69E-13 1.OOE-01
1.69E-14
9.00E-01
1.OOE-05 1.52E-18
1.69E-18 1.00E-01
1.69E-19
I
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0.OOE+00
0.OOE+00
0.OOE+00
1.1 7E-07
1.30E-08
1.17E-12
1.30E-13
1.52E-13
1.69E-14
1.52E-18
1.69E -19
EQMED SCRAMIMQ FUELHR RIMARYHRIMQATESCRAMIMQ Prob
2.40E -05 1.01E-01 1.30E -06 1.OOE-07 1.OOE-02
2.16E-05 2.16E -05
1.OOE-07
2.16E-12 2.16E-12
2.80E -11
1.OOE-07
2.80E -18
2.80E -11
2.80E -18
9.90E -01
2.40E -06
2.42E -06 1.OOE-02
2.42E -08
9.90E -01
1.OOE-07 2.40E-13
2.42E 
-13 1.OOE-02
2.42E -15
9.90E-01
3.12E-12
3.15E-12 1.OOE-02
3.1 5E-14
9.90E-01
1.OOE -07 3.1 2E -19
3.15E-19 1 .OE 
-02
3.1 5E -21
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8.99E-01
2.1 6E-05
2.16E-05
1.30E-06
2.80E-11
2.40E-05
2.40E-05
1.01E -01
2.42E-06
2.42E-06
1.30E-06
3.15E-12
2.16E-05
2.16E-12
2.80E-11
2.80E-18
2.40E-06
2.42E-08
2.40E-13
2.42E-15
3.12E-12
3.1 5E-14
3.12E-19
3.15E-21
EQ SMALL SCRAMISQ FUEL HR PRIMARY HR ATESCRAMISQ Prob
8.OE -05 1.08E-03 1 .30E -06 1.OOE-08 1.OOE-03
1.OOE+00
7.99E -05 7.99E-05
1.OE-08
7.99E -13 7.99E -13
1.0OE+00
7.99E-05
1.30E-06
1.04E-10
1.04E-10
1.04E-18
1.00E+00 8.63E-08
8.64E 
-08 1.OOE-03
8.64E-11
1.00E-08 8.63E-16
8.64E-16 1.OOE-03
8.64E-19
1.00E+00 1.12E-13
1.12E-13 1.00E-03
1.12E-16
1.00E-08 1.12E-21
1.12E-21 1.00E-03
1.12E -24
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8.00E-05
8.00E -05
9.99E-01
7.99E-05
1.08E-03
8.64E-08
1.04E-10
1.00E -08
1.04E-18
8.64E-08
1.30E-06
1.12E-13
7.99E -05
7.99E-13
1.04E -10
1.04E -18
8.63E-08
8.64E-1 1
8.63E-16
8.64E-19
1.12E-13
1.12E-16
1.12E-21
1.12E -24
FORCEDSD SCRAM FUELHR PRIMARYHR LATESCRAM Prob
5.OOE-01 1.OOE-08 1.30E-06 1.OOE-08 1.OOE-03
1.00E+00
5.OOE-01 5.OOE-01
1.OOE-08
5.OOE-09 5.OE-09
1.OOE+00
6.50E-07
1.00E-08
6.50E-15
6.50E-07
6.50E-15
1.OE+00 4.99E-09
5.OOE-09 1.OOE-03
5.OOE-12
1.OOE-08 4.99E -17
5.OOE-17 1.OOE-03
5.0OE-20
1.OOE+00 6.49E-15
6.50E-15 1.O0E-03
6.50E-18
1.OOE-08 6.49E -23
6.50E-23 1.OOE-03
6.50E-26
127 1
1.OOE+00
5.OOE-01
5.00E-01
1.30E-06
6.50E-07
5.OOE-01
5.OOE-01
5.OOE-01
5.OOE-09
6.50E-07
6.50E-15
4.99E -09
5.OOE-12
4.99E-17
5.00E-20
6.49E-15
6.50E-18
6.49E-23
6.50E-26
1.OOE-08
5.O0E-09
5.OE-09
1.30E-06
6.50E-15
LOCALBLOCK SCRAM FUELHR PRIMARYHR LATE_SCRAM Prob
1.00E-05 5.80E-09 4.35E -09 2.60E-08 1.00E-01
1.00E+00
1.00E-05
2.60E-08
1.O0E-05
2.60E-13 2.60E-13
1.00E+00
4.35E-14 4.35E-14
2.60E-08
1.13E -21 1.13E -21
9.OOE-01
1.OOE+00 5.22E-14
5.80E-14 1.O0E-01
5.80E-15
9.OOE-01
2.60E-08 1.36E-21
1.51E-21 1.O0E-01
1.51E -22
9.OOE-01
1.OOE+00 2.27E-22
2.52E-22 1.O0E-01
2.52E-23
9.00E-01
2.60E-08 5.90E-30
6.56E-30 1.OOE-01
6.56E -31
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1.OOE+00
1.O0E-05
1.00E+00
1.O0E-05
4.35E-09
4.35E-14
1.O0E-05
1.O0E-05
5.80E -09
5.80E-14
1.OOE +00
5.80E-14
4.35E -09
2.52E-22
1.00E -05
2.60E-1 3
4.35E-14
1.13E-21
5.22E-14
5.80E-15
1.36E-21
1.51E -22
2.27E-22
2.52E-23
5.90E-30
6.56E-31
1.OOE+00
7.OE -11
1.OE+00
1.19E-17
7.OOE -11
1 .19E-17
2.52E -16
2.1 OE-19
2.52E-24
1.OOE+00
4.28E-23
3.57E-26
4.28E-31
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1.OOE+00
1.19E-09
2.1OE-11
3.57E-18
RI_LARGE SCRAMIRI FUELHR PRIMARYHR LATESCRAM Prob
1.00E-07 3.01E-05 1.30E-06 1.OOE-08 1.00E-03
1.OOE+00
1.00E-07 1.00E-07
1.00E-08
1.00E-15 1.00E-15
1.00E+00
1.OOE-07
1.30E-06
1.30E-13
1.30E-13
1.30E-21
1.00E+00 3.01E-12
3.01E-12 1.00E-03
3.01E-15
1.00E-08 3.01E-20
3.01E-20 1.00E-03
3.01 E-23
1.00E+00 3.91E-18
3.91E-18 1.00E-03
3.91 E -21
1.00E-08 3.91 E-26
3.911E-26 1.00E-03
3.91 E-29
130 1
0.00E+00
1.00E-07
1.00E-07
3.01 E-05
3.01 E-12
1.30E-13
1.00E-08
1.30E-21
3.01E-12
1.30E-06
3.91 E-18
1.OOE-07
1.00E-15
1.30E -13
1.30E-21
3.01E-12
3.01E-15
3.01 E-20
3.01 E-23
3.9 1E-18
3.91E-21
3.91 E-26
3.91 E-29
RIMEDIUM SCRAMIRI FUELHR PRIMARYHR LATESCRAM Prob
2.OE-06 3.50E-05 1.30E-06 1.OOE-08 1.OOE-04
1.OOE+00
2.00E-06 2.00E -06
1.OOE-08
2.OOE-14 2.00E -14
1.OOE+00
2.60E-12
1.00E -08
2.60E -20
2.60E-12
2.60E-20
1.00E+00 7.OOE-11
7.OOE-11 1.OOE-04
7.OOE-15
1.OOE-08 7.OOE-19
7.OOE-19 1.OOE-04
7.OOE-23
1.OOE+00 9.1OE-17
9.1OE-17 1.OOE-04
9.1 OE-21
1.OOE-08 9.1OE-25
9.1OE-25 1.OOE-04
9.10E-29
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0.OOE+00
2.OOE-06
2.OOE-06
3.50E -05
7.OOE-11
2.OOE-06
1.30E-06
2.60E-12
7.OOE-1 1
1.30E-06
9.1OE-17
2.OOE-06
2.OOE-1 4
2.60E-1 2
2.60E-20
7.00E- 1
7.OOE-15
7.OOE-19
7.OOE-23
9.1OE -17
9.1OE -21
9.10E-25
9.10E-29
1.OE+00
3.OOE-13
1.OE+00
3.90E-19
3.OOE-13
3.90E-19
9.OOE-14
9.OOE-18
9.OOE-22
1.OOE+00
1.17E-19
1.17E-23
1.1 7E-27
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3.90E-11
9.OOE-10
1.1 7E-15
SGLEAK SCRAMGEM FUELHR PRIMARYHR ATESCRAMIRI Prob
1.OE-05 1.20E-13 1.30E-06 1.OOE-08 1.OOE-04
1.00E+00
1.00E-05
1.30E-06
1.30E-1 1
1.00E-05
1.00E -05
1.20E-18
1.20E-13
1.20E-18
1.30E-06
1.56E-24
1.OOE+00
1.OE-05 1.OOE-05
1.OOE-05 1.OOE-08
1.OOE-13 1.OOE-13
1.0OE+00
1.30E-11 1.30E-11
1.00E-08
1.30E-19 1.30E-19
1.OOE+00 1.20E-18
1.20E -18 1.OOE-04
1.20E-22
1.OE-08 1.20E-26
1.20E-26 1.OOE-04
1.20E-30
1.OOE+00 1.56E-24
1.56E-24 1.OE-04
1.56E-28
1.OE-08 1.56E-32
1.56E-32 1.OOE-04
1.56E-36
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1.OOE-05
1.O0E-13
1.30E-1 1
1.30E -19
1.20E-18
1.20E-22
1.20E-26
1.20E-30
1.56E-24
1.56E-28
1.56E-32
1.56E-36
PRISM FUNCTIONAL EVENT TREES
Large Seismic
Medium Seismic
Small Seismic
Forced Shutdown
Local Blockage
Loss of Flow
Large Reactivity Insertion
Medium Reactivity Insertion
Small Reactivity Insertion
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EQSMALL SCRAMISQ FUELHR jRIMARYHRjSQ LATESCRAM Prob
5.OOE-04 3.50E-08 4.35E-09 3.OOE-05 1.OOE-01
5.OOE-04 5.OOE-04
3.00E-05
1.50E-08 1.50E-08
6.50E-10 6.50E-10
5.OOE-04
1.30E-06
6.50E-10
1.95E -14
9.OOE-01
1.57E -11
1.75E-11 1.O0E-01
1.75E-12
9.OOE -01
3.OOE-05 4.72E-16
5.25E-16 1.OOE-01
5.25E -17
9.OOE -01
2.05E-17
2.27E-17 1.OOE 
-01
2.27E-18
9.OOE-01
3.OOE-05 6.1 4E-22
6.82E-22 1.OOE-01
6.82E-23
135 1
5.OOE-04
5.OOE-04
5.OOE-04
3.50E-08
1.75E-11
3.OOE-05
1.95E-14
1.75E -11
1.30E-06
2.28E-17
5.O0E-04
1.50E-08
6.50E-10
1.95E-14
1.57E-1 1
1.75E -12
4.72E-16
5.25E-1 7
2.05E-1 7
2.27E-1 8
6.14E-22
6.82E-23
EQMED SCRAMIMQ RIMARYHRIMQATE SCRAMIMQ Prob
1.1OE-05 1.20E-05 1.94E-08 2.00E-03 5.00E-01
9.98E-01
1 .1E-05
1.00E100 1.1E-05 1.10E-05
1.10E-05 2.OOE-03
2.20E-08
1.10E-05
1.94E-08
2.13E-13
1.10OE-05
1.10OE-05
1.00E+00
1.32E-10
1.20E-05
1.32E-10
1.94E-08
2.56E-18
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2.20E-08 2.20E-08
9.98E-01
2.13E -13
2.13E-13 2.13E-13
2.OOE-03
4.27E-16
4.27E-16 4.27E-16
5.OOE-01
6.59E-1 1
9.98E-01 6.59EE-11
1.32E-10 5.00E-01
6.59E-11
6.59E-11
5.OOE-01
1.32E-13
2.00E-03 1.32E-13
2.64E-13 5.00E-01
1.32E-1 3
1.32E-13
5.00E-01
1.28E-18
9.98E-01 1.28E-18
2.56E-18 5.00E-01
1.28E-1 8
1.28E-18
5.00E-01
2.56E-21
2.00E -03 2.56E -21
5.12 E-21 5.00E-01
2.56E-21
2.56E -21
EQSMALL SCRAMISQ FUELHR jRIMARYHRISQ LATESCRAM Prob
5.OOE-04 3.50E-08 4.35E-09 3.00E-05 1.OOE-01
5.OOE -04
5.OOE-04 5.OOE-04
5.OOE-04 3.OOE-05
1.50E -08
5.00E-04
1.30E-06
6.50E-10
5.00E -04
5.00E-04
1.75E -1 1
3.5 0E -08
1.75E -11
1.30E-06
2.28E-17
1.50E-08 1.50E-08
6.50E-10
6.50E-10 6.50E-10
3.OOE-05
1.95E-14
1.95E-14 1.95E-14
9.OOE-01
1.57E-1 1
1.157E -11
1.75E-11 1.00E-01
1.75E-1 2
1.75E -12
9.OE-01
4.72E -16
3.00E-05 4.72EE-16
5.25E-16 1.00E-01
5.25E-1 7
5.25E--17
9.00EE-01
2.05E-1 7
2.05E -17
2.27E 
-17 1.00E 
-01
2.27E -18
2.27E-18
9.00E -01
6.14E-22
3.00E-05 6.14E-22
6.82E 
-22 1.00E 
-01
6.82E-23
6.82E -23
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FORCEDSD SCRAM FUELHR PRIMARYHR LATESCRAM Prob
5.OOE-01 5.80E-09 4.35E-09 2.60E-08 1.OOE-01
1.OOE+00
5.OOE-01
1.OOE+00 5.00E-01 5.OOE-01
5.OOE-01 2.60E-08
1 .30E -08
1.00E+00
5.00E-01
4.3 5E -09
2.17 E-09
5.00E-01
5.00E-01
1.00E+00
2.90E -09
5.80E-09
2.90E -09
4.3 5E -09
1.26E-17
1.30E-08 1.30E-08
1.OOE+00
2.17E-09
2.17E-09 2.17E-09
2.60E-08
5.65E-1 7
5.65E-17 5.65E-17
9.OOE-01
2.6 1E-09
1.00E+00 2.61 E-09
2.90E-09 1.00E-01
2.90E-10
2.90E -10
9.00E -01
6.79E-1 7
2.60E-08 6.79E -17
7.54E-17 1.00E-01
7.54E-18
7.54E-18
9.OOE-01
1.14E-17
1.00E+00 1.14E-17
1.26E-17 1.00E-01
1.26E-18
1.26E-18
9.00E-01
2.95E-25
2.60E-08 2.95E-25
3.28E-25 1.00E-01
3.28E -26
3.28E-26
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LOCAL BLOCK SCRAM FUELHR PRIMARYHR LATESCRAM Prob
1.80E-06 5.80E-09 4.35E-09 2.60E-08 1.O0E-01
1.OOE+00
1.80E -06 1.80E-06
2.60E -08
4.68E -14 4.68E-14
1.OOE+00
7.83E-15
2.60E-08
2.04E-22
7.83E-15
2.04E-22
9.OOE-01
1.OOE+00 9.40E-15
1.04E-14 1.OOE-01
1.04E-15
9.OOE-01
2.60E-08 2.44E-22
2.71E-22 1.OOE-01
2.71E-23
9.00E-01
1.00E+00 4.09E-23
4.54E-23 1.00E-01
4.54E -24
9.00E-01
2.60E-08 1.06E-30
1. 18E -30 1.00E-01
1. 18E -31
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1.OOE+00
1.80E-06
1.OOE+00
1.80E-06
4.35E-09
7.83E-15
1.80E-06
1.80E-06
1.80E -06
4.68E-14
7.83E-15
2.04E-22
9.40E-1 5
1.04E -15
2.44E-22
2.71 E -23
4.09E -23
4.54E -24
1.06E-30
1.18E-31
5.80E-09
1.04E-14
1.OOE+00
1.04E-14
4.35E-09
4.54E-23
I
LOOP SCRAM FUELHR PRIMARY-HR LATESCRAM Prob
5.00E-02 5.80E-09 4.35E-09 2.60E-08 1.O0E-01
1.00E+00
5.00E -02
1.OOE+00 5.OOE-02 5.00E-02
5.00E-02 2.60E-08
1.30E-09
1.00E+00
5.00E-02
4.35E-09
2.17E-10
5.00E-02
5.00E-02
1.00E+00
2.90E-10
5.8 0E -09
2.90E -10
4.3 5E -09
1.26E-18
1.30E-09 1.30E-09
1.00E+00
2.17E -10
2.17E-10 2.17E-10
2.60E-08
5.65E-18
5.65E-18 5.65E-18
9.00E-01
2.61 E-10
1.00E+00 2.61 E-10
2.90E-10 1.00E-01
2.90E-1 1
2.90E-1E1
9.00E-01
6.79E-18
2.60E-08 6.79E-18
7.54E-18 1.00E-01
7.54E-19
7.54EE-19
9.00E -01
1.1 4E-1 8
1.00E+00 1.14E-18
1.26E-18 1.00E-01
1.26E-19
1.26E-19
9.00E-01
2.95E-26
2.60E-08 2.95E-26
3.28E-26 1.00E-01
3.28E-27
3.28E-27
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RILARGE SCRAMIRI FUELHR PRIMARY HR LATESCRAM Prob
1.OOE-05 2.90E-07 4.35E-09 1.OOE-08 1.O0E-01
1.OOE+00
1.OOE-05
1.OOE+00 1.OE-05 1.OOE-05
1.OE-05 1.OOE-08
1.OOE-13
1.00E-05
4.35E-09
4.35E-14
0.00E+00
1.00E-05
1.00E+00
2.90E -12
2.90E -07
2.90E-12
4.3 5E -09
1.26E-20
1.0OE-13 1.00E-13
1.OOE+00
4.35E-1 4
4.35E-14 4.35E-14
1.OOE-08
4.35E -22
4.35E -22 4.35E -22
9.OOE-01
2.61 E -12
1.00E+00 2.612E-12
2.90E2-12 1.00E-01
2.90E-13
2.90E-13
9.OOE-01
2.61E-20
1.00E-08 2.61 E-20
2.90E 
-20 1.00E-01
2.90E-21
2.90E -21
9.00E-01
1.14E -20
1.00E+00 1. 14E -20
1.26E 
-20 1.00E-01
1.26E-21
1.26E-21
9.00E-01
1. 14E -28
1.00E -08 1. 1 4E -28
1.26E 
-28 1.00E-01
1.26E-29
1.26E-29
L ____________________________________
141
RIMEDIUM SCRAMIRI FUELHR PRIMARYHR LATE SCRAM Prob
1.OOE-04 2.90E-07 4.35E-09 2.60E-08 1.OE-01
1.OOE+00
1.OE-04 1.OOE-04
2.60E-08
2.60E-12 2.60E-12
1.OE+00
1.0OE+00
1.00E-04
4.35E-09
4.35E-13
4.35E-13
1 .1 3E-20
9.OE-01
1.0OE+00 2.61E-11
2.90E-11 1.O0E-01
2.90E-12
9.00E-01
2.60E-08 6.79E -19
7.54E-19 1.O0E-01
7.54E -20
9.0OE-01
1.O0E+00 1.14E-19
1.26E-19 1.O0E-01
1.26E-20
9.OOE-01
2.60E-08 2.95E-27
3.28E-27 1.O0E-01
3.28E -28
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0.OE+00
1.OE-04
1.OOE-04
2.90E -07
2.90E-11
4.35E-13
2.60E-08
1.13E-20
1.OE+00
2.90E-1 1
4.35E-09
1.26E-19
1.OOE-04
2.60E-12
4.35E-13
1.13E-20
2.61E-11
2.90E-12
6.79E-1 9
7.54E-20
1.14E-19
1.26E-20
2.95E-27
3.28E-28
RISMALL SCRAM|RI FUELHR PRIMARYHR LATESCRAM Prob
1.OOE-04 2.90E-07 4.35E-09 2.60E-08 1.O0E-01
1.OOE+00
1.00E-04 1.OOE-04
2.60E-08
2.60E-12 2.60E-12
1.OOE+00
1.30E -10
2.60E-08
3.38E-18
1.30E-10
3.38E-18
9.00E-01
1.00E+00 2.61E-11
2.90E-11 1.O0E-01
2.90E-12
9.00E-01
2.60E -08 6.79E-19
7.54E-19 1.00E-01
7.54E -20
9.00E-01
1.0OE+00 1.14E-19
1.26E-19 1.00E-01
1.26E-20
9.00E-01
2.60E-08 2.95E-27
3.28E-27 1.00E-01
3.28E-28
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1.00E-04
1.OOE-04
1.30E-06
1.30E-10
0.00E+00
1.OOE-04
1.OOE-04
2.60E-12
1.30E-10
3.38E-18
2.61 E-11
2.90E-12
6.79E-1 9
7.54E-20
1.14E-19
1.26E-20
2.95E-27
3.28E-28
2.90E-07
2.90E-11
1.00E+00
2.90E-1 1
4.35E-09
1.26E-19
SGLEAK SCRAM FUELHR PRIMARYHR LATESCRAM Prob
1.0OE-02 5.80E-09 4.35E-09 2.60E-08 1.O0E-01
1.OOE+00
1.OOE-02 1.0OE-02
2.60E-08
2.60E-10 2.60E-10
1.OOE+00
4.35E -11
2.60E -08
1.13E-18
4.35E-11
1.13E-18
9.OOE-01
1.OOE+00 5.22E-11
5.80E 
-11 1.O0E-01
5.80E-12
9.OOE-01
2.60E -08 1.36E-18
1.51E-18 1.OOE-01
1.51E-19
9.OOE-01
1.OOE+00 2.27E-19
2.52E-19 1.OOE-01
2.52E -20
9.OOE -01
2.60E -08 5.90E-27
6.56E-27 1.O0E-01
6.56E-28
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1.OOE+00
1.OOE-02
1.OOE+00
1.OOE-02
4.35E -09
4.35E-11
1.OOE-02
1.OOE-02
5.80E-09
5.80E-11
1.OOE+00
5.80E-1 1
4.35E -09
2.52E-19
1.OOE-02
2.60E-1 0
4.35E-1 1
1.13E-18
5.22E -11
5.80E-12
1.36E-18
1.51E-19
2.27E -19
2.52E-20
5.90E-27
6.56E-28
